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a b s t r a c t
The aim of this paper is to obtain a theoretical foundation of inconsistency-tolerant (or
paraconsistent) reasoning by presenting a comprehensive study of the structural proof-
theory of David Nelson’s paraconsistent logic. Inconsistency handling has a growing
importance in Computer Science since inconsistenciesmay frequently occur in knowledge-
based and intelligent information systems. Paraconsistent, inconsistency-tolerant logics
have been studied to cope with such inconsistencies. In this paper, proof systems
for Nelson’s paraconsistent logic N4 are comprehensively studied. The logic N4 is a
fundamental system and known to be a common basis for various extended and useful
paraconsistent logics. Some basic theorems including cut-elimination, normalization and
completeness are uniformly proved using various embedding theorems. A variety of
sequent calculi and natural deduction systems for N4 and some closely related systems
are presented and compared.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Nelson’s paraconsistent logic: a common basis for various paraconsistent logics
Inconsistency handling has a growing importance in Computer Science since inconsistencies may frequently occur in
knowledge-based and intelligent information systems [4,7,11,18]. Paraconsistent (or inconsistency-tolerant) logics [50,51]
have been widely studied to cope with such inconsistencies [5,7,22,61]. The aim of this paper is to obtain a theoretical
foundation of automated inconsistency-tolerant (or paraconsistent) reasoning based on a basic paraconsistent logic.
Although there exists a broad variety of paraconsistent logics, Nelson’s paraconsistent (four-valued) logic N4 (also referred
to in the literature as N−) [1] is known to be one of the most important and basic paraconsistent logics in Computer
Science [13,21,45–47,68,70,72]. It is known that N4 is a common basis for various extended and useful paraconsistent logics
[5,7,22,33,35,36,45,46,61]. N4 is also known to be a paraconsistent variant of Nelson’s constructive (three-valued) logic N3
✩ This paper includes some reformulated and refined results of some parts of the papers (Kamide, 2005 [30], Kamide, 2010 [31], Kamide, 2010 [32],
Wansing, 2008 [73]) and some standard, established material. It gives a uniform perspective on new and traditional proof systems for paraconsistent
reasoning in Nelson’s constructive logic with strong negation. The results concerning (Kamide, 2005 [30], Kamide, 2010 [31], Kamide, 2010 [32], Wansing,
2008 [73]) are summarized as follows. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 include some reformulations of some results of Kamide (2010) [31], Sections 3.1 and 3.2 include
some refinements of some parts of Kamide (2010) [32], Section 3.4 includes a presentation of the display calculus for Heyting–Brouwer logic in Wansing
(2008) [73], and Section 4 includes some reformulations of someparts of Kamide (2005) [30]. The original results of Kamide (2005) [30], Kamide (2010) [31],
Kamide (2010) [32] and Wansing (2008) [73] were obtained from different perspectives and sometimes with different methods. These are reformulated
and refined by a new uniform perspective based on some embedding theorems. This is one of the new contributions of the present paper.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 234 32 24718.
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(also referred to as N) [42], which has been studied by several mathematical logicians. Nelson’s logics were, for example,
originally motivated by the idea of defining a logic ‘‘in which falsity is conceived in a fashion analogous to that for
intuitionistic truth’’ [1, p. 231], namely a logic that not only possesses the well-known disjunction property (if α ∨ β is
provable, then either α or β is provable), but also enjoys the property of constructible falsity (if ∼(α ∧ β) is provable, then
either∼α or∼β is provable). It is known that N4 is an extension of the so called useful four-valued logic by Belnap [9] and
Dunn [20], which has a wide range of applications to Computer Science. Moreover, a number of applications in Computer
Science, such as logic programming [13,47,48,68] based on N4 itself, have been proposed by several researchers.
Gentzen-type sequent calculi for Nelson’s logics have been investigated [37,47,70], and Kripke semantics for Nelson’s
logics have also been studied [57,64,70]. A translation of N3 into intuitionistic logic has been proposed and studied by
Gurevich [28], Rautenberg [56] and Vorob’ev [67]. A similar translation for N4 into LJ can also be obtained.
A Hilbert-style system NH4 for Nelson’s four-valued logic is obtained by adding the following axiom schemes for a
paraconsistent negation connective∼:
1. ∼∼α ↔ α,
2. ∼(α ∧ β)↔ (∼α ∨∼β),
3. ∼(α ∨ β)↔ (∼α ∧∼β),
4. ∼(α→β)↔ (α ∧∼β).
to modus ponens and the following axiom schemes of positive intuitionistic logic:
5. α → (β → α),
6. (α → (β → γ ))→ ((α → β)→ (α → γ )),
7. (α ∧ β)→ α,
8. (α ∧ β)→ β ,
9. (α → β)→ ((α → γ )→ (α → (β ∧ γ ))),
10. α → (α ∨ β),
11. β → (α ∨ β),
12. (α → γ )→ ((β → γ )→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ )).
A Hilbert-style system for N3 is obtained from that of N4 by adding the axiom scheme (α ∧ ∼α)→β . It was shown by
Odintsov [43] that N3 is embeddable into N4. The lattices of extensions of N4 and its augmentation by a falsity constant, the
system N4⊥, are comprehensively studied in [44].
1.2. Relation to other logics
A useful four-valued logic (or equivalently first-degree entailment logic) was introduced by Belnap [9] and Dunn [20], and
some Gentzen-type sequent calculi and their completeness and cut-elimination have been studied (see e.g., [3,23,52]). It
is known that Belnap and Dunn’s four-valued logic and the {∧,∨,∼}-fragment of N4 are the same logic. A number of
generalized or extended versions of Belnap and Dunn’s logic have also been widely studied as some bilattice and trilattice
logics (see e.g., [5,6,21,34,60–62,75,74]). A similarity between Nelson’s logics and certain extensions of Belnap and Dunn’s
logic was also pointed out by Gargov [24] in a historical account.
N4 is closely related to Rauszer’s H–B (Heyting–Brouwer) logic (or equivalently bi-intuitionistic logic) and dual-intuitionistic
logics (or equivalently falsification logics). H–B logic was introduced by Rauszer [54,55] in order to extend intuitionistic
logic by the connective of co-implication. H–B logic can represent a certain notion of ‘‘falsification’’ and the concept of
‘‘verification’’ simultaneously. H–B logic has been investigated using semantic methods such as algebraic and Kripke-type
semantics, and has also been extended to some modal versions (see e.g., [38,76]). Dual-intuitionistic logic and variants of
it were proposed and studied by Czermak [16], Goodman [27], Urbas [66], Goŕe [25] and Shramko [59], see also [29]. The
relation between H–B logic and variants of dual-intuitionistic logic was pointed out by Goŕe [25]. Dual-intuitionistic logic
and it’s variants have the same connective of co-implication as in H–B logic, and therefore can express a certain notion of
falsification.
1.3. Basic results
Some basic results on N4 are addressed in Section 2. The contents of Section 2 are summarized as follows.
Firstly, N4 and LJ are defined as some standard Gentzen-type sequent calculi, and some standard Kripke semantics for N4
and LJ are given. Two theorems for syntactically and semantically embedding N4 into LJ are presented based on the sequent
calculi and the Kripke semantics, respectively. By using these embedding theorems, the cut-elimination and completeness
theorems for N4 are proved uniformly. The embedding-based cut-elimination and completeness proof is a new contribution.
Secondly, relationships among N4, Rauszer’s H–B logic and dual-intuitionistic logics are clarified using some sequent
calculus based embedding theorems. To consider this issue, the logical connectives used are restricted to {∧,∨} or {∧,∨,∼},
i.e., the discussion is focused on the corresponding fragments of these logics. A sequent calculus DJ−, which is the {∧,∨}-
fragment of dual-intuitionistic logic, is presented, and a sequent calculus HB−, which is theorem-equivalent to the {∧,∨}-
fragment of Rauszer’s sequent calculus G1 [54] for H–B logic, is defined asHB− = LJ−+DJ−where LJ− is the {∧,∨}-fragment
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of LJ. Some theorems for embedding N4−, the {∧,∨,∼}-fragment of N4, into DJ− and for embedding HB− into N4− are
proved.
1.4. Sequent calculi
Varieties of alternative sequent calculi for N4 and its fragments are presented in Section 3. The contents of Section 3 are
summarized as follows.
Firstly, a contraction-free system G4np for N4 is introduced by extending the positive fragment of the contraction-free
system G4ip [65] for intuitionistic logic, and the structural rule elimination theorem for G4np is shown. The equivalence
between G4np and N4 is also derived using this structural rule elimination theorem. Some backgrounds for contraction-free
systems are briefly explained below. It is known that there are many cut-free sequent calculi for intuitionistic logic, such
as Gentzen’s LJ and its variants G1ip, G2ip, G3ip, G4ip and G5ip [65]. In particular, the contraction-free system G4ip has
the useful feature that bottom-up proof search terminates without any loop-detection, and hence G4ip is known to be a
convenient basis for automated theorem proving. A direct simple proof of the structural rule elimination theorem for G4ip
was given by Dyckhoff and Negri [19].
Secondly, a resolution system Rnp for N4 is introduced by modifying a resolution system Rip for intuitionistic logic, and
the equivalence between Rnp and an auxiliary system G5np is proved by using Troelstra and Schwichtenberg’s method
[65]. The system Rip was introduced by Troelstra and Schwichtenberg, and, as mentioned in [65], it can be regarded as a
modification of Mints’ original system RIp [39]. The system G5np presented here may be regarded as a modified extension
of Troelstra and Schwichtenberg’s system G5ip for intuitionistic logic.
Thirdly, a subformula calculus Sn4 and a dual calculus Dn4 are introduced. Sn4 has the subformula property, and Dn4
has dual-context sequents. The equivalence among Sn4, Dn4 and N4 is presented, and the cut-elimination theorems for Sn4
and Dn4 are shown.
Fourthly, a display calculus δN4⊥ for the logic N4⊥, which conservatively extends N4 by a falsity constant⊥, and a display
calculus δHB for Heyting–Brouwer logic are presented.
Finally, some sequent calculi for the→-free fragment of N4, which is equivalent to Belnap and Dunn’s four-valued logic,
and a sequent calculus for Arieli and Avron’s bilattice logic, which is an extension of N4, are reviewed.
1.5. Natural deduction
Varieties of natural deduction systems for N4 are presented in Section 4. The contents of Section 4 are summarized as
follows.
Firstly, a standard type natural deduction systemNN4 for N4 is introduced based on the idea of Priest [50]. NN4 is obtained
from Priest’s system for the logic Efde of first-degree entailment by adding the inference rules that correspond to some
axiom schemes with respect to the implication and negation connectives. NN4 is obtained also from the well-known natural
deduction system for positive intuitionistic logic by adding some inference rules for∼. The (weak) normalization theorem
for NN4 is shown via a correspondence between NN4 and an alternative cut-free sequent calculus SN4 for N4.
Secondly, a sequent calculus LN4 in natural deduction style and a natural deduction system GN4 in sequent calculus style
are introduced based on the framework by Negri and von Plato [40]. The (general) normalization theorem for GN4 is shown.
GN4 is an extension of the original system by Negri and von Plato for (positive) intuitionistic logic. The idea of Schroeder-
Heister [58] using some general elimination rules for strongly negated formulas is applied in the negation part of GN4. The
framework by Negri and von Plato is known to be an alternative intermediate framework between natural deduction and
sequent calculus.
Thirdly, the following systems are addressed: Prawitz’s system [49], called here PN4, a special case of Schroeder-Heister’s
formulation, called here HN4, two extensions of Negri and von Plato’s uniform calculi [41], called here UN4 and VN4, and an
extension of Tamminga and Tanaka’s system [63] for Efde, called here TN4.
Some historical backgrounds for natural deduction systems for N4 are briefly explained below. A typed λ-calculus λc
for N4 was introduced by Wansing in [70,69]. He proved a Curry–Howard correspondence (with respect to λc and N4) and
the completeness theorem (for λc) with respect to an extended version of Friedman’s full type structures over infinite sets.
It is known that Prawitz’s natural deduction system PN4 [49] has some inference rules with respect to the paraconsistent
negation axioms which correspond to the axiom schemes∼(α→β)↔ α ∧∼β and∼(α ∧ β)↔ ∼α ∨∼β .
For the sake of surveyability, the various proof systems to be dealt with are listed in Table 1.
2. Basic results
2.1. Sequent calculus and cut-elimination
The usual propositional languagewith→ (implication),∧ (conjunction),∨ (disjunction) and∼ (paraconsistent negation)
is used in this section. Lower-case letters p, q, r, . . . are used to denote propositional variables, Greek lower-case letters
α, β, γ , . . . are used to denote formulas, and Greek capital letters Γ ,∆, . . . are used to represent finite (possibly empty)
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Table 1
A list of proof systems.
Section 1.1 HN4 Axiom system for Nelson’s four-valued logic
Section 2.1 N4 Sequent calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
LJ Sequent calculus for positive intuitionistic logic
Section 2.3 DJ− Sequent calculus for the {∧,∨}-fragment of dual intuitionistic logic
LJ− {∧,∨}-fragment of LJ
HB− DJ− + IJ−
N4− {∧,∨,∼}-fragment of N4
Section 3.1 G4np Contraction free sequent calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
G4ip⊥ ⊥-free fragment of the intuitionistic sequent calculus G4ip
Section 3.2 G5np Auxiliary sequent calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
Rnp Resolution calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
Section 3.3 Sn4 Subformula sequent calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
Dn4 Dual sequent calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
Section 3.4 HN4⊥ Axiom system for Nelson’s four-valued logic extended by⊥
δN4⊥ Display calculus for N4⊥
G1 Non-cut-free sequent calculus for Heyting–Brouwer logic
δHB Cut-free display sequent calculus for Heyting–Brouwer logic
Section 3.5 GB Sequent calculus for first-degree entailment logic
GFV Sequent calculus for first-degree entailment logic
LEfde1 Sequent calculus for first-degree entailment logic
BL Sequent calculus for bilattice logic
Section 4.1 NN4 Natural deduction system for Nelson’s four-valued logic
SN4 Alternative sequent calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
Section 4.2 LN4 natural deduction style sequent calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
GN4 Sequent style natural deduction calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic
Section 4.3 PN4 Prawitz’s natural deduction system for Nelson’s four-valued logic
HN4 Another natural deduction system for Nelson’s four-valued logic
UN4 Another natural deduction system for Nelson’s four-valued logic
VN4 Another natural deduction system for Nelson’s four-valued logic
TN4 Another natural deduction system for Nelson’s four-valued logic
multisets of formulas. We use α ↔ β as an abbreviation of (α → β) ∧ (β → α). A sequent is an expression of the form
Γ ⇒ γ . If a sequent S is provable in a sequent calculus L, then such a fact is denoted as L ⊢ S or ⊢ S. A rule of inference R is
said to be admissible in a sequent calculus L if the following condition is satisfied: for any instance
S1 · · · Sn
S
of R, if L ⊢ Si for all i, then L ⊢ S.
Definition 2.1 (N4 [37,47,70]). The initial sequents of N4 are of the form: for any propositional variable p,
p ⇒ p ∼p ⇒ ∼p.
The structural inference rules of N4 are of the form:
Γ ⇒ α α,Σ ⇒ γ
Γ ,Σ ⇒ γ (cut)
Γ ⇒ γ
α,Γ ⇒ γ (we)
α, α,Γ ⇒ γ
α,Γ ⇒ γ (co).
The logical inference rules of N4 are of the form:
Γ ⇒ α β,∆⇒ γ
α→β,Γ ,∆⇒ γ (→l)
α,Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α→β (→r)
α, β,Γ ⇒ γ
α ∧ β,Γ ⇒ γ (∧l)
Γ ⇒ α Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α ∧ β (∧r)
α,Γ ⇒ γ β,Γ ⇒ γ
α ∨ β,Γ ⇒ γ (∨l)
Γ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β (∨r1)
Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β (∨r2)
α,Γ ⇒ γ
∼∼α,Γ ⇒ γ (∼∼l)
Γ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ ∼∼α (∼∼r)
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α,∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
∼(α→β),Γ ⇒ γ (∼→l)
Γ ⇒ α Γ ⇒ ∼β
Γ ⇒ ∼(α→β) (∼→r)
∼α,Γ ⇒ γ ∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
∼(α ∧ β),Γ ⇒ γ (∼∧ l)
Γ ⇒ ∼α
Γ ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ r1)
Γ ⇒ ∼β
Γ ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ r2)
∼α,∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
∼(α ∨ β),Γ ⇒ γ (∼∨ l1)
Γ ⇒ ∼α Γ ⇒ ∼β
Γ ⇒ ∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨ r).
Next, we introduce a sequent calculus LJ for positive intuitionistic logic. The name ‘‘LJ’’ is mostly used to denote a sequent
calculus for intuitionistic logic rather than its positive fragment. But, for the sake of notational simplicity, it is used for the
positive fragment in this paper.
Definition 2.2 (LJ). A sequent calculus LJ for positive intuitionistic logic is defined as the ∼-free fragment of N4, i.e., LJ is
obtained from N4 by deleting all the initial sequents of the form∼p ⇒ ∼p for any propositional variable p and deleting all
the logical inference rules concerning∼.
The sequents of the form α ⇒ α for any formula α are provable in cut-free LJ and cut-free N4. This fact is proved by
induction on the complexity of α.
Definition 2.3. We fix a set Φ of propositional variables and define the set Φ ′ := {p′ | p ∈ Φ} of propositional variables.
The language LN4 of N4 is defined using Φ ,→,∧,∨ and∼. The language LLJ of LJ is obtained from LN4 by adding Φ ′ and
deleting∼.
A mapping f fromLN4 toLLJ is defined inductively by:
1. for any p ∈ Φ , f (p) := p and f (∼p) := p′ ∈ Φ ′,
2. f (α ◦ β) := f (α) ◦ f (β)where ◦ ∈ {→,∧,∨},
3. f (∼∼α) := f (α),
4. f (∼(α→β)) := f (α) ∧ f (∼β),
5. f (∼(α ∧ β)) := f (∼α) ∨ f (∼β),
6. f (∼(α ∨ β)) := f (∼α) ∧ f (∼β).
An expression f (Γ ) denotes the result of replacing every occurrence of a formula α in Γ by an occurrence of f (α).
Theorem 2.4 (Syntactical Embedding). Let Γ be a multiset of formulas in LN4, γ be a formula in LN4, and f be the mapping
defined in Definition 2.3. Then:
1. N4 ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ iff LJ ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ),
2. N4− (cut) ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ iff LJ− (cut) ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ).
Proof. Since the claim (2) can be obtained from a part of the proof of (1), we show only (1) in the following.
• (=⇒) : By induction on the proofs P of Γ ⇒ γ in N4.We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P , and
show some cases.
Case (∼p ⇒ ∼p): The last inference of P is of the form:∼p ⇒ ∼p for a propositional variable p. In this case, we obtain
the required fact LJ ⊢ f (∼p)⇒ f (∼p) since f (∼p) coincides with p′ ∈ Φ ′ by the definition of f .
Case (∼→r): The last inference of P is of the form:
Γ ⇒ α Γ ⇒ ∼β
Γ ⇒ ∼(α→β) (∼→r).
By induction hypothesis, we have: LJ ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (α) and LJ ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (∼β). Then, we obtain the required fact:
....
f (Γ )⇒ f (α)
....
f (Γ )⇒ f (∼β)
f (Γ )⇒ f (α) ∧ f (∼β) (∧r)
where f (α) ∧ f (∼β) coincides with f (∼(α→β)) by the definition of f .
Case (∼∼l): The last inference of P is of the form:
α,Σ ⇒ γ
∼∼α,Σ ⇒ γ (∼∼l).
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By induction hypothesis, we have: LJ ⊢ f (α), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ ), and hence obtain: LJ ⊢ f (∼∼α), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ )where f (∼∼α)
coincides with f (α) by the definition of f .
Case (∼∧l): The last inference of P is of the form:
∼α,Σ ⇒ γ ∼β,Σ ⇒ γ
∼(α ∧ β),Σ ⇒ γ (∼∧ l).
By induction hypothesis, we have: LJ ⊢ f (∼α), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ ) and LJ ⊢ f (∼β), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ ). Thus, we obtain the required
fact:
....
f (∼α), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ )
....
f (∼β), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ )
f (∼α) ∨ f (∼β), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ ) (∨l)
where f (∼α) ∨ f (∼α) coincides with f (∼(α ∧ β)) by the definition of f .
• (⇐=) : By induction on the proofs Q of f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ) in LJ. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of
Q , and show some cases.
Case (cut): The last inference of Q is of the form:
f (Γ 1)⇒ β β, f (Γ 2)⇒ f (γ )
f (Γ 1), f (Γ 2)⇒ f (γ ) (cut).
Since β is in LLJ, we have the fact β = f (β). This fact can be shown by induction on β . Then, by induction hypothesis, we
have: N4 ⊢ Γ 1 ⇒ β and N4 ⊢ β,Γ 2 ⇒ γ . We then obtain the required fact: N4 ⊢ Γ 1,Γ 2 ⇒ γ by using (cut) in N4.
Case (∨l): The last inference rule of Q is of the form:
f (∼α), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ ) f (∼β), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ )
f (∼α) ∨ f (∼β), f (Σ)⇒ f (γ ) (∨l)
where f (∼α)∨f (∼β) coincideswith f (∼(α∧β)) by the definition of f . By induction hypothesis, we have: N4⊢∼α,Σ ⇒ γ
and N4 ⊢ ∼β,Σ ⇒ γ . Thus, we obtain the required fact:
....∼α,Σ ⇒ γ
....∼β,Σ ⇒ γ
∼(α ∧ β),Σ ⇒ γ (∼∧ l). 
Theorem 2.5 (Cut-Elimination). The rule (cut) is admissible in cut-free N4.
Proof. Suppose N4 ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ . Then, we have: LJ ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ) by Theorem 2.4(1), and hence obtain: LJ − (cut) ⊢
f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ) by the well-known cut-elimination theorem for LJ. By Theorem 2.4(2), we obtain the required fact: N4 −
(cut) ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ . 
Theorem 2.6 (Decidability). N4 is decidable.
Proof. By the decidability of LJ, for each α, it is possible to decide whether f (α) is provable in LJ. Then, by Theorem 2.4, N4
is decidable. 
By Theorem 2.5, we can obtain the following properties of constructible falsity and paraconsistency.
Proposition 2.7 (Constructible Falsity). For any formulas α and β , if N4 ⊢ ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β), then either N4 ⊢ ⇒ ∼α or N4 ⊢
⇒ ∼β .
Proof. By considering only cut-free proofs of N4, a which is justified by Theorem 2.5. 
Definition 2.8. Let ♯ be a unary connective and L be a sequent calculus L. L is called explosive with respect to ♯ if L ⊢
α, ♯α ⇒ β for any formulas α and β . L is called paraconsistentwith respect to ♯ if it is not explosive with respect to ♯.
Proposition 2.9 (Paraconsistency). N4 is paraconsistent with respect to∼.
Proof. Consider a sequent p, ♯p ⇒ q where p and q are distinct propositional variables. Then, the unprovability of this
sequent is guaranteed by Theorem 2.5. 
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2.2. Kripke semantics and completeness
Definition 2.10. A Kripke frame is a structure ⟨M, R⟩ satisfying the following conditions:
1. M is a nonempty set,
2. R is a reflexive and transitive binary relation onM .
Definition 2.11. A valuation |= on a Kripke frame ⟨M, R⟩ is amapping from the setΦ of propositional variables to the power
set 2M ofM such that for any p ∈ Φ and any x, y ∈ M , if x ∈ |= (p) and xRy, then y ∈ |= (p). We will write x |= p for x ∈ |=
(p). This valuation |= is extended to a mapping from the set of all formulas (of LJ) to 2M by:
1. x |= α→β iff ∀y ∈ M [xRy and y |= α imply y |= β],
2. x |= α ∧ β iff x |= α and x |= β ,
3. x |= α ∨ β iff x |= α or x |= β .
The following heredity condition holds for |=: for any formula α and any x, y ∈ M , if x |= α and xRy, then y |= α. This is
proved by induction on α.
Definition 2.12. A Kripke model is a structure ⟨M, R, |=⟩ such that
1. ⟨M, R⟩ is a Kripke frame,
2. |= is a valuation on ⟨M, R⟩.
A formula α is true in a Kripke model ⟨M, R, |=⟩ if x |= α for any x ∈ M , and is LJ-valid in a Kripke frame ⟨M, R⟩ if it is true
for every valuation |= on the Kripke frame.
Definition 2.13. Paraconsistent valuations |=+ and |=− on a Kripke frame ⟨M, R⟩ are mappings from the set Φ of
propositional variables to the power set 2M of M such that for any ⋆ ∈ {+,−}, any p ∈ Φ and any x, y ∈ M , if x ∈ |=⋆ (p)
and xRy, then y ∈ |=⋆ (p). We will write x |=⋆ p for x ∈ |=⋆ (p). These paraconsistent valuations |=+ and |=− are extended to
mappings from the set of all formulas (of N4) to 2M by:
1. x |=+ α→β iff ∀y ∈ M [xRy and y |=+ α imply y |=+ β],
2. x |=+ α ∧ β iff x |=+ α and x |=+ β ,
3. x |=+ α ∨ β iff x |=+ α or x |=+ β ,
4. x |=+ ∼α iff x |=− α,
5. x |=− ∼α iff x |=+ α,
6. x |=− α→β iff x |=+ α and x |=− β ,
7. x |=− α ∧ β iff x |=− α or x |=− β ,
8. x |=− α ∨ β iff x |=− α and x |=− β .
The heredity condition holds for |=+ and |=−.
Definition 2.14. A paraconsistent Kripke model is a structure ⟨M, R, |=+, |=−⟩ such that
1. ⟨M, R⟩ is a Kripke frame,
2. |=+ and |=− are paraconsistent valuations on ⟨M, R⟩.
A formula α is true in a paraconsistent Kripke model ⟨M, R, |=+, |=−⟩ if x |=+ α for any x ∈ M , and is N4-valid in a Kripke
frame ⟨M, R⟩ if it is true for every paraconsistent valuations |=+ and |=− on the Kripke frame.
Lemma 2.15. Let f be the mapping defined in Definition 2.3. For any paraconsistent Kripke model ⟨M, R, |=+, |=−⟩, we can
construct a Kripke model ⟨M, R, |=⟩ such that for any formula α ∈LN4 and any x ∈ M,
1. x |=+ α iff x |= f (α),
2. x |=− α iff x |= f (∼α).
Proof. Let Φ be a set of propositional variables and Φ ′ be the set {p′ | p ∈ Φ} of propositional variables. Suppose that
⟨M, R, |=+, |=−⟩ is a paraconsistent Kripke model where |=+ and |=− are mappings from Φ to the power set 2M ofM , and
that the heredity condition w.r.t. p ∈ Φ holds for |=+ and |=−. Suppose that ⟨M, R, |=⟩ is a Kripke model where |= is a
mapping from Φ ∪ Φ ′ to 2M , and that the heredity condition w.r.t. p ∈ Φ ∪ Φ ′ holds for |=. Suppose moreover that these
models satisfy the following conditions: for any x ∈ M and any p ∈ Φ ,
1. x |=+ p iff x |= p,
2. x |=− p iff x |= p′.
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Then, the claim is proved by (simultaneous) induction on the complexity of α. We use the symbol≡ to denote syntactical
identity.
• Base step:
Case α ≡ p ∈ Φ: For (1), we obtain: x |=+ p iff x |= p iff x |= f (p) (by the definition of f ). For (2), we obtain: x |=− p iff
x |= p′ iff x |= f (∼p) (by the definition of f ).
• Induction step:
Case α ≡ β ∧ γ : For (1), we obtain: x |=+ β ∧ γ iff x |=+ β and x |=+ γ iff x |= f (β) and x |= f (γ ) (by induction
hypothesis for (1)) iff x |= f (β) ∧ f (γ ) iff x |= f (β ∧ γ ) (by the definition of f ). For (2), we obtain: x |=− β ∧ γ iff x |=− β
or x |=− γ iff x |= f (∼β) or x |= f (∼γ ) (by induction hypothesis for (2)) iff x |= f (∼β) ∨ f (∼γ ) iff x |= f (∼(β ∧ γ )) (by
the definition of f ).
Case α ≡ β ∨ γ : Similar to the above case.
Case α ≡ β→γ : For (1), we obtain: x |=+ β→γ iff ∀y ∈ M[xRy and y |=+ β imply y |=+ γ ] iff ∀y ∈ M[xRy and
y |= f (β) imply y |= f (γ )] (by induction hypothesis for (1)) iff x |= f (β)→f (γ ) iff x |= f (β→γ ) (by the definition of f ).
For (2), we obtain: x |=− β→γ iff x |=+ β and x |=− γ iff x |= f (β) and x |= f (∼γ ) (by induction hypothesis for (1) and
(2)) iff x |= f (β) ∧ f (∼γ ) iff x |= f (∼(β→γ )) (by the definition of f ).
Case α ≡ ∼β: For (1), we obtain: x |=+ ∼β iff x |=− β iff x |= f (∼β) (by induction hypothesis for (2)). For (2), we
obtain: x |=− ∼β iff x |=+ β iff x |= f (β) (by induction hypothesis for (1)) iff x |= f (∼∼β) (by the definition of f ). 
Lemma 2.16. Let f be the mapping defined in Definition 2.3. For any Kripke model ⟨M, R, |=⟩, we can construct a paraconsistent
Kripke model ⟨M, R, |=+, |=−⟩ such that for any formula α and any x ∈ M,
1. x |= f (α) iff x |=+ α,
2. x |= f (∼α) iff x |=− α.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2.15. 
Theorem 2.17 (Semantical Embedding). Let f be the mapping defined in Definition 2.3. For any formula α,
α is N4-valid iff f (α)is LJ-valid.
Proof. By Lemmas 2.15 and 2.16. 
Theorem 2.18 (Completeness, cf. [31]). For any formula α,
N4 ⊢ ⇒ α iff α is N4-valid.
Proof. N4 ⊢⇒ α iff LJ ⊢⇒ f (α) (by Theorem 2.4) iff f (α) is LJ-valid (by the well-known Kripke completeness theorem
for LJ) iff α is N4-valid (by Theorem 2.17). 
2.3. Relation to other logics
The logical connectives used below are restricted to {∧,∨} or {∧,∨,∼}. The following discussion is focused on the
corresponding fragments of N4, dual intuitionistic logic and H–B logic.
A sequent calculus DJ− for the {∧,∨}-fragment of dual-intuitionistic logic is introduced below. A sequent of DJ− is an
expression of the form γ ⇒ Γ .
Definition 2.19 (DJ−). The initial sequents of DJ− are of the form: for any propositional variable p,
p ⇒ p.
The structural rules of DJ− are of the form:
γ ⇒ Γ , α α ⇒ ∆
γ ⇒ Γ ,∆ (cut-d)
γ ⇒ Γ , α, α
γ ⇒ Γ , α (co-d)
γ ⇒ Γ
γ ⇒ Γ , α (wk-d).
The logical inference rules of DJ− are of the form:
α ⇒ Γ
α ∧ β ⇒ Γ (∧l1-d)
β ⇒ Γ
α ∧ β ⇒ Γ (∧l2-d)
γ ⇒ Γ , α γ ⇒ Γ , β
γ ⇒ Γ , α ∧ β (∧r-d)
α ⇒ Γ β ⇒ Γ
α ∨ β ⇒ Γ (∨l-d)
γ ⇒ Γ , α
γ ⇒ Γ , α ∨ β (∨r1-d)
γ ⇒ Γ , β
γ ⇒ Γ , α ∨ β (∨r2-d).
Definition 2.20 (N4−). The sequent calculus N4− is defined as the {∧,∨,∼}-fragment of N4.
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Definition 2.21. We fix a set Φ of propositional variables and define the set Φ ′ := {p′ | p ∈ Φ} of propositional variables.
The language LN4− of N4− is defined using Φ , ∧,∨ and ∼. The language LDJ− of DJ− is obtained from LN4− by adding Φ ′
and deleting∼.
A mapping e fromLN4− toLDJ− is defined as follows.
1. e(p) := p and e(∼p) := p′ ∈ Φ ′ for any p ∈ Φ ,
2. e(α ∧ β) := e(α) ∨ e(β),
3. e(α ∨ β) := e(α) ∧ e(β),
4. e(∼∼α) := e(α),
5. e(∼(α ◦ β)) := e(∼α) ◦ e(∼β)where ◦ ∈ {∧,∨}.
Theorem 2.22 (Syntactical Embedding). Let Γ be a multiset of formulas inLN4− , γ be a formula inLN4− , and e be the mapping
defined in Definition 2.21. Then:
1. N4− ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ iff DJ− ⊢ e(γ )⇒ e(Γ ),
2. N4− − (cut) ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ iff DJ− − (cut− d) ⊢ e(γ )⇒ e(Γ ).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.4. 
Theorem 2.23 (Cut-Elimination). The rule (cut-d) is admissible in cut-free DJ−.
Proof. By Theorem 2.22 and the cut-elimination theorem for N4−. 
A sequent calculus HB− for the {∧,∨}-fragment of H–B logic is introduced below. A sequent of HB− is an expression
of the form Σ ⇒ ∆ where Σ and ∆ cannot have more than one element simultaneously, or equivalently, are of the form
eitherΣ ⇒ δ or σ ⇒ ∆.
Definition 2.24 (H–B Logic). Let LJ− be the {∧,∨}-fragment of LJ. Then, HB− is defined as
HB− = DJ− + LJ−.
Note that the original sequent calculus G1 [54] for H–B logic adopts the one-element restriction of sequents, and uses
the restricted versions of ∧-right and ∨-left introduction rules:
Γ ⇒ ∆, α Γ ⇒ ∆, β
Γ ⇒ ∆, α ∧ β (∧r
′)
α,Γ ⇒ ∆ β,Γ ⇒ ∆
α ∨ β,Γ ⇒ ∆ (∨l
′)
where the antecedent and the succedent of the sequents of these rules cannot be multisets of more than one-element
simultaneously. Also note thatG1 adopts the corresponding restricted right-weakening rulewith the one-element condition.
In HB−, the original version (∧r′) (and (∨l′)) is divided into the present versions (∧r) and (∧r-d) ((∨l) and (∨l-d),
respectively). The one-element condition for (∧r′) and (∨l′) gives the same result as using the two sequent expressions
Γ ⇒ γ and γ ⇒ Γ .
Definition 2.25. Let FHB− and FN4− (SHB− and SN4− ) be the sets of formulas (the sets of sequents) of HB− and N4−,
respectively. Let THB− and TN4− be the sets of multisets consisting of the formulas in FHB− and FN4− , respectively.
A mapping g from FHB− to FN4− , from THB− to TN4− and from SHB− to SN4− is defined as follows.
1. g(p) := p for any p ∈ Φ ,
2. g(α ◦ β) := g(α) ◦ g(β)where ◦ ∈ {∧,∨},
3. g({γ 1, . . . , γ n}) := {g(γ 1), . . . , g(γ n)},
4. g(Γ ⇒ γ ) := g(Γ )⇒ g(γ ),
5. g(γ ⇒ Γ ) := ∼g(Γ )⇒ ∼g(γ ).
Theorem 2.26 (Syntactical Embedding). Let g be the mapping defined in Definition 2.25, and S be a sequent in SHB− . Then:
1. HB− ⊢ S iff N4− ⊢ g(S),
2. HB− − {(cut), (cut− d)} ⊢ S iff N4− − (cut) ⊢ g(S).
Proof. We only show (1).
• (=⇒) : By induction on the proofs P of S in HB−. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . We only
show the following case.
Case (∧r-d): The last inference of P is of the form:
γ ⇒ Γ , α γ ⇒ Γ , β
γ ⇒ Γ , α ∧ β (∧r-d)
where S ≡ γ ⇒ Γ , α ∧ β . By induction hypothesis, we have: N4− ⊢ g(γ ⇒ Γ , α), i.e., N4− ⊢ ∼g(Γ ),∼g(α)⇒ ∼g(γ )
by the definition of g , and N4− ⊢ g(γ ⇒ Γ , β), i.e., N4− ⊢ ∼g(Γ ),∼g(β)⇒ ∼g(γ ) by the definition of g . Thus,
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we obtain: N4− ⊢ ∼g(Γ ),∼(g(α) ∧ g(β))⇒ ∼g(γ ) using (∼∧l). This means the required fact: N4− ⊢ g(γ ⇒ Γ , α ∧ β)
by the definition of g .
• (⇐=) : By induction on the proofs P of g(S) in N4−. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . Note
that there are no cases for (∼r) and (∼l), because by the definition of g , g(S) does not allow a nested negation expression
such as∼g(Γ )⇒ ∼∼g(α). We only show the following case.
Case (∼∧l): The last inference of P is of the form:
∼g(α),∼g(Γ )⇒ ∼g(γ ) ∼g(β),∼g(Γ )⇒ ∼g(γ )
∼(g(α) ∧ g(β)),∼g(Γ )⇒ ∼g(γ ) (∼∧ l)
where g(S) ≡ g(γ ⇒ α ∧ β,Γ ) coincides with ∼(g(α) ∧ g(β)),∼g(Γ )⇒ ∼g(γ ) by the definition of g . By induction
hypothesis, we have: HB− ⊢ γ ⇒ α,Γ and HB− ⊢ γ ⇒ β,Γ . We thus obtain the required fact: HB− ⊢ γ ⇒ α ∧ β,Γ by
using (∧r-d). 
Theorem 2.27 (Cut-elimination). The rules (cut) and (cut-d) are admissible in cut-free HB−.
Proof. By Theorem 2.26 and the cut-elimination theorem for N4−. 
3. Sequent calculi
3.1. Contraction-free system
In this section we present the contraction-free, cut-free and weakening-free sequent calculus G4np for Nelson’s four-
valued logic, cf. [32].
Definition 3.1 (G4np). The initial sequents of G4np are of the form: for any propositional variable p,
p,Γ ⇒ p ∼p,Γ ⇒ ∼p.
The logical inference rules of G4np are (→r), (∧l), (∧r), (∨l), (∧r1), (∧r2), (∼l), (∼r), (∼∧l), (∼∧r1), (∼∧r2), (∼∨l), (∼∨r),
(∼→l), (∼→r) from Definition 2.1, and the rules of the form:
p, β,Γ ⇒ γ
p, p→β,Γ ⇒ γ (→l0)
∼p, β,Γ ⇒ γ
∼p,∼p→β,Γ ⇒ γ (∼→l0)
α1→(α2→β),Γ ⇒ γ
(α1 ∧ α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (∧→l)
α1→β, α2→β,Γ ⇒ γ
(α1 ∨ α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (∨→l)
α1, α2→β,Γ ⇒ α2 β,Γ ⇒ γ
(α1→α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (→→l)
∼α1→β,∼α2→β,Γ ⇒ γ
∼(α1 ∧ α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (∼∧→l)
∼α1→(∼α2→β),Γ ⇒ γ
∼(α1 ∨ α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (∼∨→l)
α1→(∼α2→β),Γ ⇒ γ
∼(α1→α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (∼→→l).
The∼-free part of G4np is called here G4ip⊥, which is the⊥-free fragment of G4ip [65].
Roughly speaking, the rules (→l0), (∼→l0), (∧→l), (∨→l), (→→l), (∼∧→l), (∼∨→l) and (∼→→l) can be regarded
as some divided versions of the rule:
α→β,Γ ⇒ α β,Γ ⇒ γ
α→β,Γ ⇒ γ
where α is divided into p,∼p, α1 ∧ α2, α1 ∨ α2, α1→α2, ∼(α1 ∧ α2), ∼(α1 ∨ α2) and ∼(α1→α2). In the rule just
displayed above, the principal formula α→β appears twice, i.e., in one of the upper sequents and in the lower sequent.
Such occurrences of α→β derive some inefficient proof search procedures with loops. Since G4np is loop-free, it is regarded
as efficient.
Lemma 3.2. Let Γ be a multiset of formulas inLN4, γ be a formula inLN4, R be the set {(cut), (co), (we)}, and f be the mapping
defined in Definition 2.3. Then:
1. if G4np+ R ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ , then G4ip⊥ + R ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ),
2. if G4ip⊥ ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ), then G4np ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.4. 
Theorem 3.3 (Structural Rule Elimination). The rules (cut), (co) and (we) are admissible in G4np.
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Proof. Suppose G4np + {(cut), (co), (we)} ⊢Γ ⇒ γ . Then, we have G4ip⊥ + {(cut), (co), (we)} ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ) by Lemma 3.2
(1), and hence G4ip⊥ ⊢ f (Γ )⇒ f (γ ) by the structural rule elimination theorem for G4ip⊥, which was directly proved by
Dyckhoff and Negri [19]. By Lemma 3.2(2), we obtain the required fact: G4np ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ . 
Theorem 3.4 (Equivalence Between N4 and G4np). For any sequent S,
G4np ⊢ S iff N4 ⊢ S.
Proof. • (=⇒): We can straightforwardly prove that if a sequent S is provable in G4np then it is provable in N4. This is
proved by induction on the proofs P of S in G4np. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . We only
illustrate the case that the last inference of P is of the form:
α1, α2→β,Γ ⇒ α2 β,Γ ⇒ γ
(α1→α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (→→l).
By induction hypothesis, both α1, α2→β,Γ ⇒ α2 and β,Γ ⇒ γ are provable in N4. Then, we have the required proof:
α2 ⇒ α2
α1, α2 ⇒ α2 (we)
α2 ⇒ α1→α2
β ⇒ β
β, α2 ⇒ β (we)
(α1→α2)→β, α2 ⇒ β
(α1→α2)→β ⇒ α2→β
α1, α2→β,Γ ⇒ α2
α2→β,Γ ⇒ α1→α2
(α1→α2)→β,Γ ⇒ α1→α2 (cut)
β,Γ ⇒ γ
β, (α1→α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (we)
(α1→α2)→β, (α1→α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ
(α1→α2)→β,Γ ⇒ γ (co).
• (⇐=): We prove that if a sequent S is provable in N4 then it is provable in G4np. This is proved by induction on the
proofs P of S in N4.We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . We show some cases. The cases that the last
inference of P is (cut), (co) or (we) can be shown by Theorem 3.3. The case that the last inference of P is (→l) can be proved
using the fact that (→l) is admissible in G4np. This fact can be shown in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.3: We
use the result by Dyckhoff and Negri [19]1 that (→l) is admissible in G4ip, and prove a similar lemma as Lemma 3.2 with
respect to (→l). 
3.2. Auxiliary system and resolution system
On theway to defining a resolution calculus forNelson’s four-valued logic,we first introduce the auxiliary sequent system
G5np, cf. [32].
For the multiset with multiplicity one which is obtained from a multiset Γ , we write (Γ ), i.e., the multiset (Γ ) contains
the formulas of Γ with multiplicity one. For example, if Γ is the multiset {α, α, β}, then (Γ ) is the multiset {α, β}.
Definition 3.5 (G5np). The initial sequents of G5np are of the form: for any propositional variable p,
p,Γ ⇒ p ∼p,Γ ⇒ ∼p.
The inference rules of G5np are of the form:
Γ ⇒ α α,∆⇒ γ
(Γ ,∆)⇒ γ (cut∗)
α,Γ ⇒ γ
(α ∧ β,Γ )⇒ γ (∧l1∗)
β,Γ ⇒ γ
(α ∧ β,Γ )⇒ γ (∧l2∗)
α, β,Γ ⇒ γ
(α ∧ β,Γ )⇒ γ (∧l3∗)
Γ ⇒ α ∆⇒ β
(Γ ,∆)⇒ α ∧ β (∧r∗)
α,Γ ⇒ γ β,∆⇒ γ
(α ∨ β,Γ ,∆)⇒ γ (∨l∗)
Γ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β (∨r1∗)
Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β (∨r2∗)
Γ ⇒ α β,∆⇒ γ
(α→β,Γ ,∆)⇒ γ (→l∗)
α,Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α→β (→r1∗)
Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α→β (→r2∗)
α,Γ ⇒ γ
(∼∼α,Γ )⇒ γ (∼l∗)
Γ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ ∼∼α (∼r∗)
1 Lemma 4.1 on page 1503 in [19].
12 N. Kamide, H. Wansing / Theoretical Computer Science 415 (2012) 1–38
∼α,Γ ⇒ γ ∼β,∆⇒ γ
(∼(α ∧ β),Γ ,∆)⇒ γ (∼∧ l∗)
Γ ⇒ ∼α
Γ ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ r1∗)
Γ ⇒ ∼β
Γ ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ r2∗)
∼α,Γ ⇒ γ
(∼(α ∨ β),Γ )⇒ γ (∼∨ l1∗)
∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
(∼(α ∨ β),Γ )⇒ γ (∼∨ l2∗)
∼α,∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
(∼(α ∨ β),Γ )⇒ γ (∼∨ l3∗)
Γ ⇒ ∼α ∆⇒ ∼β
(Γ ,∆)⇒ ∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨ r∗)
α,Γ ⇒ γ
(∼(α→β),Γ )⇒ γ (∼→l1∗)
∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
(∼(α→β),Γ )⇒ γ (∼→l2∗)
α,∼β,Γ ⇒ γ
(∼(α→β),Γ )⇒ γ (∼→l3∗)
Γ ⇒ α ∆⇒ ∼β
(Γ ,∆)⇒ ∼(α→β) (∼→r∗).
The sequents of the form α,Γ ⇒ α for any formula α are provable in G5np, and hence these sequents are also regarded
as initial sequents.
Note that G5np is a modified extension of the system G5ip which is introduced by Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [65]
in order to prove the equivalence between Rip (see p. 3) and G5ip. We also remark that the initial sequents of G5np are
different from G5ip: G5ip has initial sequents of the forms α ⇒ α and⊥ ⇒ α.
Proposition 3.6 (Equivalence Between G5np and G4np). For any sequent Γ ⇒ γ ,
1. if G5np ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ , then G4np ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ ,
2. if G4np ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ , then G5np ⊢ Γ ′ ⇒ γ for some Γ ′ ⊆ Γ .
Proof. Straightforward induction on the proofs of G5np and G4np. 
Next, we introduce Rnp based on the notion of intuitionistic clauses.
Definition 3.7. A formula is called a literal if it is a propositional variable or a negated propositional variable. A sequent is
called an intuitionistic clause if it is one of the following forms:
(P→Q )⇒ R, P ⇒ (Q ∨ R), P1, . . . , Pn ⇒ Q
where P,Q , R, P1, . . . , Pn represent literals, and n can be 0.
Definition 3.8 (Rnp). Let P,Q , R, S be literals and all the sequents of Rnp be intuitionistic clauses.
The axioms of Rnp are of the form:
P,∆⇒ P.
The inference rules of Rnp are of the form:
Γ ⇒ P P,∆⇒ Q
(Γ ,∆)⇒ Q (resol)
P ⇒ Q ∨ R Γ ⇒ P Q ,∆⇒ S R,Σ ⇒ S
(Γ ,∆,Σ)⇒ S (∨resol)
(P→Q )⇒ R [P],∆⇒ Q
∆⇒ R (→resol)
where [P] represents P or the empty multiset.
Note that Rnp is amodification of the systemRip (for intuitionistic logic) introduced in [65]. In Rip, the formulas P,Q , R, S,
which are used as literals in Rnp, are propositional variables. As mentioned in [65], Rip is based onMints’ framework in [39].
Also note that the axioms in Rip are of the forms P ⇒ P and⊥ ⇒ P .
The expression lα , called the label of a formula α, stands for a literal which corresponds to a formula α. For a multiset Γ
≡ {γ 1, . . . , γ n} of formulas, lΓ means the multiset {lγ 1 , . . . , lγ n}. For any propositional variable p, lp and l∼p are defined
by p and∼p, respectively. For any compound formula γ , the interpretation of lγ is considered below.
Definition 3.9. For any formulas α and β , we define:
1. Cα∧β = { lα∧β ⇒ lα; lα∧β ⇒ lβ ; lα, lβ ⇒ lα∧β },
2. Cα∨β = { lα∨β ⇒ lα ∨ lβ ; lα ⇒ lα∨β ; lβ ⇒ lα∨β },
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3. Cα→β = { lα→β, łα ⇒ lβ ; (lα→lβ)⇒ lα→β },
4. C∼∼α = { ł∼∼α ⇒ lα; łα ⇒ l∼∼α},
5. C∼(α∧β) = { l∼(α∧β) ⇒ l∼α ∨ l∼β ; l∼α ⇒ l∼(α∧β); l∼β ⇒ l∼(α∧β)},
6. C∼(α∨β) = { l∼(α∨β) ⇒ l∼α; l∼(α∨β) ⇒ l∼β ; l∼α, l∼β ⇒ l∼(α∨β)},
7. C∼(α→β) = { l∼(α→β) ⇒ lα; l∼(α→β) ⇒ l∼β ; lα, l∼β ⇒ l∼(α→β)}.
The expression Nsub(α) represents the set of all non-literal subformulas and non-literal negated-subformulas of a formula
α. Let γ be an arbitrary non-literal formula. Then, we define:
Cl(γ ) =

{Cδ | δ ∈ Nsub(γ )}.
Let Γ be a set {γ 1, . . . , γ n} (n ≥ 2) of non-literal formulas. Then, we define:
Cl(Γ ) = Cl(γ 1) ∪ · · · ∪ Cl(γ n).
Note that Cl(γ ) is a set of intuitionistic clauses. Suppose that an expressionα ↔ βmeans⊢α ⇒ β and⊢β ⇒ α. Cl(γ ) is
intended to address the interpretation of the label expression lγ as lp ↔ p, l∼p ↔ ∼p, lα∧β ↔ (lα∧ lβ), lα∨β ↔ (lα∨ lβ),
lα→β ↔ (lα→lβ), l∼∼α ↔ lα , l∼(α∧β) ↔ (l∼α ∨ l∼β), l∼(α∨β) ↔ (l∼α ∧ l∼β) and l∼(α→β) ↔ (lα ∧ l∼β). Such
an interpretation is regarded as the label version of the mapping f defined in Definition 2.3.
Lemma 3.10. If G5np+ Cl(γ ) ⊢⇒ lγ , then G5np ⊢⇒ γ .
Proof. Suppose G5np + Cl(γ ) ⊢ ⇒ lγ . Let P be a proof of⇒ lγ in G5np + Cl(γ ). If we substitute α for all the labels lα
everywhere in P , then łγ becomes γ and all the sequents in Cl(γ ) appearing in P becomeG5np-provable sequents. Therefore
G5np ⊢⇒ γ . 
Lemma 3.11. If G5np ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ , then Rnp+ Cl(Γ , γ ) ⊢ lΓ ⇒ lγ .
Proof. By induction on the proofs P of Γ ⇒ γ in G5np. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . We
show some cases.
Case (∼∨l3∗): The last inference of P is of the form:
∼α,∼β,Σ ⇒ γ
(∼(α ∨ β),Σ)⇒ γ (∼∨ l3∗).
By induction hypothesis, we have: Rnp+ Cl(∼α,∼β,Σ, γ ) ⊢ l∼α, l∼β, lΣ ⇒ lγ . We then obtain:
l∼(α∨β) ⇒ l∼β
l∼(α∨β) ⇒ l∼α l∼α, l∼β, lΣ ⇒ lγ
(l∼(α∨β), l∼β, lΣ )⇒ lγ
(resol)
(l∼(α∨β), lΣ )⇒ lγ
(resol).
Since l∼(α∨β) ⇒ l∼α , l∼(α∨β) ⇒ l∼β ∈ Nsub(∼(α ∨ β)), it holds that Rnp+ Cl(∼(α ∨ β),Σ, γ ) ⊢ l∼(α∨β), lΣ ⇒ lγ .
Case (∼∨r∗): The last inference of P is of the form:
Σ ⇒ ∼α ∆⇒ ∼β
(Σ,∆)⇒ ∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨ r∗).
By induction hypothesis, we have: Rnp+ Cl(Σ,∼α) ⊢ lΣ ⇒ l∼α and Rnp+ Cl(∆,∼β) ⊢ l∆ ⇒ l∼β . We then obtain:
l∆ ⇒ l∼β
lΣ ⇒ l∼α l∼α, l∼β ⇒ l∼(α∨β)
(lΣ , l∼β)⇒ l∼(α∨β)
(resol)
(lΣ , l∆)⇒ l∼(α∨β)
(resol).
Case (∼∧l∗): The last inference of P is of the form:
∼α,Σ ⇒ γ ∼β,∆⇒ γ
(∼(α ∧ β),Σ,∆)⇒ γ (∼∧ l∗).
By induction hypothesis, we have: Rnp + Cl(∼α,Σ, γ ) ⊢ lΣ , l∼α ⇒ lγ and Rnp + Cl(∼β,∆, γ ) ⊢ l∆, l∼β ⇒ lγ . We
then obtain:
l∼(α∧β) ⇒ l∼α ∨ l∼β l∼(α∧β) ⇒ l∼(α∧β) lΣ , l∼α ⇒ lγ l∆, l∼β ⇒ lγ
(l∼(α∧β), lΣ , l∆)⇒ lγ
(∨resol).
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Case (→r1∗): The last inference of P is of the form:
α,∆⇒ β
∆⇒ α→β (→r1∗).
By induction hypothesis, we have: Rnp+ Cl(α,∆, β) ⊢ lα, l∆ ⇒ lβ . We then obtain:
lα→lβ ⇒ lα→β lα, l∆ ⇒ lβ
l∆ ⇒ lα→β (→resol).
Case (→l∗): The last inference of P is of the form:
Σ ⇒ α β,∆⇒ γ
(α→β,Σ,∆)⇒ γ (→l∗).
By induction hypothesis, we have: Rnp+ Cl(Σ, α) ⊢ lΣ ⇒ lα and Rnp+ Cl(β,∆, γ ) ⊢ lβ, l∆ ⇒ lγ . We then obtain:
lΣ ⇒ lα
lα→β, lα ⇒ lβ lβ, l∆ ⇒ lγ
(lα→β, lα, l∆)⇒ lγ
(resol)
(lα→β, lΣ , l∆)⇒ lγ
(resol).

Lemma 3.12. Let C be a set of intuitionistic clauses. For any intuitionistic clause Γ ⇒ P, if Rnp + C ⊢ Γ ⇒ P, then G5np +
C ⊢ Γ ⇒ P.
Proof. By induction on the proofs of Γ ⇒ P in Rnp+C . 
Theorem 3.13 (Equivalence Between Rnp and G5np). For any formula γ ,
G5np ⊢ ⇒ γ iff Rnp+ Cl(γ ) ⊢ ⇒ lγ .
Proof. (=⇒): By Lemma 3.11. (⇐=): Suppose Rnp + Cl(γ ) ⊢⇒ lγ . By Lemma 3.12, we have G5np + Cl(γ ) ⊢⇒ łγ . We
thus obtain G5np ⊢⇒ γ by Lemma 3.10. 
3.3. Subformula calculus and dual calculus
A subformula calculus Sn4, which has the subformula property, is introduced below. The sequents of Sn4 are of the
form Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : γ and Γ : ∆⇒ γ : ∅ where γ is a formula, and Γ and ∆ are multisets of formulas. We call Γ (∆) in
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : γ and Γ : ∆⇒ γ : ∅ a negative (positive) context, and also call the left/right-conclusion γ in the sequents a
negative/positive conclusion. The sequents of the form:
γ 1, . . . , γ m : δ1, . . . , δn ⇒ ∅ : γ γ 1, . . . , γ m : δ1, . . . , δn ⇒ γ : ∅
(0 ≤ m, n) in Sn4 correspond to the sequents of the form:
∼γ 1, . . . ,∼γ m, δ1, . . . , δn ⇒ γ ∼γ 1, . . . ,∼γ m, δ1, . . . , δn ⇒ ∼γ
in N4. In the following definitions, C stands for ∅ : γ or γ : ∅.
Definition 3.14 (Sn4). The initial sequents of Sn4 are of the form:
∅ : α ⇒ ∅ : α α : ∅ ⇒ α : ∅.
The specific inference rules of Sn4 are of the form:
Γ : ∆⇒ α : ∅
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : ∼α (∼r+)
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : α
Γ : ∆⇒ ∼α : ∅ (∼r−)
α,Γ : ∆⇒ C
Γ : ∼α,∆⇒ C (∼l+)
Γ : α,∆⇒ C
∼α,Γ : ∆⇒ C (∼l−).
The structural rules of Sn4 are of the form:
Γ 1 : ∆1 ⇒ α : ∅ α,Γ 2 : ∆2 ⇒ C
Γ 1,Γ 2 : ∆1,∆2 ⇒ C (cut−)
Γ 1 : ∆1 ⇒ ∅ : α Γ 2 : α,∆2 ⇒ C
Γ 1,Γ 2 : ∆1,∆2 ⇒ C (cut+)
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α, α,Γ : ∆⇒ C
α,Γ : ∆⇒ C (co−)
Γ : α, α,∆⇒ C
Γ : α,∆⇒ C (co+)
Γ : ∆⇒ C
α,Γ : ∆⇒ C (we−)
Γ : ∆⇒ C
Γ : α,∆⇒ C (we+).
The positive inference rules of Sn4 are of the form:
Γ 1 : ∆1 ⇒ ∅ : α Γ 2 : β,∆2 ⇒ C
Γ 1,Γ 2 : α→β,∆1,∆2 ⇒ C (→l+)
Γ : α,∆⇒ ∅ : β
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : α→β (→r+)
Γ : α,∆⇒ C
Γ : α ∧ β,∆⇒ C (∧l1+)
Γ : β,∆⇒ C
Γ : α ∧ β,∆⇒ C (∧l2+)
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : α Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : β
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : α ∧ β (∧r1+)
Γ : α,∆⇒ C Γ : β,∆⇒ C
Γ : α ∨ β,∆⇒ C (∨l1+)
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : α
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : α ∨ β (∨r1+)
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : β
Γ : ∆⇒ ∅ : α ∨ β (∨r2+).
The negative inference rules of Sn4 are of the form:
β,Γ : α,∆⇒ C
α→β,Γ : ∆⇒ C (→l−)
Γ 1 : ∆1 ⇒ β : ∅ Γ 2 : ∆2 ⇒ ∅ : α
Γ 1,Γ 2 : ∆1,∆2 ⇒ α→β : ∅ (→r−)
α,Γ : ∆⇒ C β,Γ : ∆⇒ C
α ∧ β,Γ : ∆⇒ C (∧l−)
Γ : ∆⇒ α : ∅
Γ : ∆⇒ α ∧ β : ∅ (∧r1−)
Γ : ∆⇒ β : ∅
Γ : ∆⇒ α ∧ β : ∅ (∧r2−)
α,Γ : ∆⇒ C
α ∨ β,Γ : ∆⇒ C (∨l1−)
β,Γ : ∆⇒ C
α ∨ β,Γ : ∆⇒ C (∨l2−)
Γ : ∆⇒ α : ∅ Γ : ∆⇒ β : ∅
Γ : ∆⇒ α ∨ β : ∅ (∨r−).
Theorem 3.15 (Equivalence Between Sn4 and N4). Let Γ and∆ be multisets of formulas, and γ be a formula. Then:
1. if Sn4 ⊢ Γ : ∆⇒ C where C is either ∅ : γ or γ : ∅, then N4 ⊢ ∼Γ ,∆⇒ C ′ where C ′ ≡ γ if C ≡ ∅ : γ and C ′ ≡ ∼γ if
C ≡ γ : ∅,
2. if N4 − (cut) ⊢ ∼Γ ,∆⇒ C ′ where C ′ is either γ or ∼γ , then Sn4 − {(cut−), (cut+)} ⊢ Γ : ∆⇒ C where C ≡ ∅ : γ if
C ′ ≡ γ and C ≡ γ : ∅ if C ′ ≡ ∼γ .
Theorem 3.16 (Cut-Elimination). The rules (cut+) and (cut−) are admissible in cut-free Sn4.
Proof. Suppose that a sequent Γ : ∆⇒ C is provable in Sn4. Then, the sequent ∼Γ ,∆⇒ C ′ is provable in N4 by
Theorem 3.15(1), and hence the sequent ∼Γ ,∆⇒ C ′ is provable in cut-free N4 by the cut-elimination theorem for N4.
Therefore Γ : ∆⇒ C is provable in cut-free Sn4 by Theorem 3.15(2). 
Corollary 3.17 (Subformula Property). Sn4 has the subformula property, i.e., if a sequent S is provable in Sn4, then there is a
proof P of S such that all formulas appearing in P are subformulas of some formula in S.
Next, a dual calculus Dn4 is introduced. A sequent of the form Γ ⇒+ γ is called a positive sequent, and a sequent of the
form Γ ⇒− γ is called a negative sequent. In the following definitions, γ in an expression Γ ⇒+ γ or Γ ⇒− γ for any
multiset Γ of formulas stands for a single formula, and for any multiset∆ ofLN4 formulas,∼∆ is defined as {¬α : α ∈ ∆}.
Definition 3.18 (Dn4). The initial sequents of Dn4 are of the form:
α ⇒+ α α ⇒− α.
The specific inference rules of Dn4 are of the form:
∼Γ ,∆⇒− γ
Γ ,∼∆⇒+ ∼γ (−/+ 1)
∼Γ ,∆⇒− ∼γ
Γ ,∼∆⇒+ γ (−/+ 2)
∼Γ ,∆⇒+ γ
Γ ,∼∆⇒− ∼γ (+/− 1)
∼Γ ,∆⇒+ ∼γ
Γ ,∼∆⇒− γ (+/− 2).
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The structural inference rules of Dn4 are of the form:
Γ ⇒+ α α,Σ ⇒+ γ
Γ ,Σ ⇒+ γ (+cut)
Γ ⇒− α α,Σ ⇒− γ
Γ ,Σ ⇒− γ (−cut)
α, α,Γ ⇒+ γ
α,Γ ⇒+ γ (+co)
α, α,Γ ⇒− γ
α,Γ ⇒− γ (−co)
Γ ⇒+ γ
α,Γ ⇒+ γ (+we)
Γ ⇒− γ
α,Γ ⇒− γ (−we).
The positive inference rules of Dn4 are of the form:
Γ ⇒+ α β,Σ ⇒+ γ
α→β,Γ ,Σ ⇒+ γ (+→l)
Γ , α ⇒+ β
Γ ⇒+ α→β (+→r)
α,∆⇒+ γ
α ∧ β,∆⇒+ γ (+∧ l1)
β,∆⇒+ γ
α ∧ β,∆⇒+ γ (+∧ l2)
Γ ⇒+ α Γ ⇒+ β
Γ ⇒+ α ∧ β (+∧ r)
α,∆⇒+ γ β,∆⇒+ γ
α ∨ β,∆⇒+ γ (+∨ l)
Γ ⇒+ α
Γ ⇒+ α ∨ β (+∨ r1)
Γ ⇒+ β
Γ ⇒+ α ∨ β (+∨ r2).
The negative inference rules of Dn4 are of the form:
β,∼α,∆⇒− γ
α→β,∆⇒− γ (−→l)
Γ ⇒− β ∆⇒− ∼α
Γ ,∆⇒− α→β (−→r)
α,∆⇒− γ β,∆⇒− γ
α ∧ β,∆⇒− γ (−∧ l)
Γ ⇒− α
Γ ⇒− α ∧ β (−∧ r1)
Γ ⇒− β
Γ ⇒− α ∧ β (−∧ r2)
α,∆⇒− γ
α ∨ β,∆⇒− γ (−∨ l1)
β,∆⇒− γ
α ∨ β,∆⇒− γ (−∨ l2)
Γ ⇒− α Γ ⇒− β
Γ ⇒− α ∨ β (−∨ r).
Let L be Dn4− {(−cut), (+cut)}. Then, the following facts hold: for any multisets Γ ,∆, and any formulas α, γ ,
1. L ⊢ Γ ⇒+ γ iff L ⊢ Γ ⇒+ ∼∼γ ,
2. L ⊢ Γ ⇒− γ iff L ⊢ Γ ⇒− ∼∼γ ,
3. L ⊢ α,Γ ⇒+ γ iff L ⊢ ∼∼α,Γ ⇒+ γ ,
4. L ⊢ α,Γ ⇒− γ iff L ⊢ ∼∼α,Γ ⇒− γ .
Theorem 3.19 (Equivalence Between Dn4 and N4). Let Γ be a multiset of formulas, and γ be a formula. Then:
1. if Dn4 ⊢ Γ ⇒∗ γ (∗ ∈ {+,−}), then N4 ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ if ∗ = +, or N4 ⊢ ∼Γ ⇒ ∼γ if ∗ = −,
2. if N4− (cut) ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ , then Dn4− {(−cut), (+cut)} ⊢ Γ ⇒+ γ .
Proof. • (1) By induction on the proofs P of Γ ⇒∗ γ (∗ ∈ {+,−}) in Dn4. We distinguish the cases according to the last
inference of P . We only show the following cases.
Case (+/− 1): The last inference of P is of the form:
∼Γ ,∆⇒+ γ
Γ ,∼∆⇒− ∼γ (+/− 1).
By induction hypothesis, we have: N4⊢∼Γ ,∆⇒ γ . Then we obtain the required fact: N4⊢∼Γ ,∼∼∆⇒ ∼∼γ by using
(∼l) and (∼r).
N. Kamide, H. Wansing / Theoretical Computer Science 415 (2012) 1–38 17
Case (−→l): The last inference of P is of the form:
β,∼α,∆⇒− γ
α→β,∆⇒− γ (−→l).
By induction hypothesis, we have: N4 ⊢ ∼β,∼∼α,∼∆⇒ ∼γ . Then we obtain the required fact:
α ⇒ α
α ⇒ ∼∼α (∼r)
....∼β,∼∼α,∼∆⇒ ∼γ
∼β, α,∼∆⇒ ∼γ (cut)
∼(α→β),∼∆⇒ ∼γ (∼→l).
• (2) By induction on the cut-free proofs P of Γ ⇒ γ in N4. We distinguish cases according to the last inference of P . We
only show the following case.
Case (∼→l): The last inference of P is of the form:
∼β, α,∆⇒ γ
∼(α→β),∆⇒ γ (∼→l).
By induction hypothesis, we have: Dn4− {(−cut), (+cut)} ⊢ ∼β, α,∆⇒+ γ . Then we have the required fact:
....
∼β, α,∆⇒+ γ
β,∼α,∼∆⇒− ∼γ (+/− 1)
α→β,∼∆⇒− ∼γ (−→l)
∼(α→β),∆⇒+ γ (−/+ 2). 
Theorem 3.20 (Cut-Elimination). The rules (+cut) and (−cut) are admissible in cut-free Dn4.
Proof. Suppose that a sequent Γ ⇒∗ γ (∗ ∈ {+,−}) is provable in Dn4. Then, by Theorem 3.19(1), the sequent Γ ⇒ γ is
provable in N4 if ∗ = +, or ∼Γ ⇒ ∼γ is provable in N4 if ∗ = −. Hence the sequent Γ ⇒ γ or ∼Γ ⇒ ∼γ is provable
in cut-free N4 by the cut-elimination theorem for N4. If Γ ⇒ γ is provable in cut-free N4, then Γ ⇒+ γ is provable in
cut-free Dn4 by Theorem 3.19(2). If∼Γ ⇒ ∼γ is provable in cut-free N4, then∼Γ ⇒+ ∼γ is provable in cut-free Dn4 by
Theorem 3.19(2), and hence Γ ⇒− γ is provable in cut-free Dn4. 
3.4. Display calculus
Display calculi have been developed by Nuel Belnap [10] as a flexible extension of Gentzen’s sequent calculi. They use
a language of sequents that enables the formulation of structural rules in terms of structure connectives and permit the
combination of structure operations having a different inferential behavior. Display sequent systems use their structure
connectives as context sensitive or context-shift operations. Like Gentzen’s comma, a structure operation typically has
an antecedent interpretation as a certain object language connective and a succedent interpretation as another object
language connective. These object language connectives may be said to be Gentzen duals of each other and often they form
a residuated pair. The term ‘‘display logic’’ emphasizes the fact that the structure connectives are regulated by rules (the
so-called ‘‘display postulates’’) that allow a single formula or a more complex structure of a sequent to be displayed as the
entire antecedent or succedent of a structurally equivalent sequent.
A display sequent calculus for Nelson’s four-valued logic may be found in [73]. This system extends rules for a display
calculus for positive intuitionistic logic by rules for strongly negated formulas. We here present the display calculus δN4⊥
for the logic N4⊥ from [44].2 The system δN4⊥ has separate rules for each connective. The logic N4⊥ conservatively extends
N4 by a falsity constant⊥. An axiom system HN4⊥ for N4⊥ is obtained from HN4 by adding the axiom schemes
⊥→ α and α →∼⊥.
The system δN4 makes use of a binary structure connective ◦, a unary shift operation ∗, and the structure constant I (‘‘the
empty structure’’).
Definition 3.21. The set of structures Struc(LN4∪{⊥}) generated fromLN4 ∪ {⊥} is defined as follows:
formulas: α ∈ LN4 ∪ {⊥}
structures: X ∈ Struc(LN4)
X ::= α | I | (X ◦ X).
2 This presentation modifies and amends the presentation in [71].
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The sequents of δN4 are expressions
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4,
where each Xi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) is a structure.
Definition 3.22 (Display Calculus δN4⊥). The initial sequents of δN4⊥ are of the form: for any propositional variable p,
p | I⇒ p | I I | p ⇒ I | p.
The display postulates of δN4⊥ are of the form:
X1 | X2 ◦ ∗Y ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 ◦ Y | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
Y | ∗X1 ◦ X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 ◦ ∗Y | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ◦ Y ⇒ X3 | X4
∗X2 ◦ X1 | Y ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4 ◦ ∗Y
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 ◦ Y | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ Y | ∗X3 ◦ X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 ◦ ∗Y | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4 ◦ Y
X1 | X2 ⇒ ∗X4 ◦ X3 | Y
where two double-line rules are combined into a single one at a time, and the double-line rules indicate that the rules may
be applied both downwards and upwards.
The additional structural rules of δN4⊥ are of the form:
X1 | X2 ⇒ α | X4 α | X ′2 ⇒ X3 | X ′4
X1 | X2 ◦ X ′2 ⇒ X3 | X4 ◦ X ′4
(odd cut)
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | α X ′1 | α ⇒ X ′3 | X4
X1 ◦ X ′1 | X2 ⇒ X3 ◦ X ′3 | X4
(even cut)
I ◦ X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | I ◦ X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ I ◦ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | I ◦ X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
(X ◦ Y ) ◦ Z | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X ◦ (Y ◦ Z) | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ (X ◦ Y ) ◦ Z | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X ◦ (Y ◦ Z) | X4
Y ◦ X | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X ◦ Y | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ Y ◦ X | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X ◦ Y | X4
X ◦ X | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X ◦ X | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 ◦ Y | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 ◦ Y | X4
The introduction rules of δN4⊥ are of the form:
X1 | X2 ⇒ I | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ ⊥ | X4 X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | ⊥
⊥ | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | I⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | ⊥ ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ ∗α | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ ∼α | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | ∗α
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | ∼α
∗α | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
∼α | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | ∗α ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | ∼α ⇒ X3 | X4
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X1 | X2 ⇒ α | X4 X1 | X2 ⇒ β | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ α ∧ β | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | α ◦ β
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | α ∧ β
α ◦ β | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
α ∧ β | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | α ⇒ X3 | X4 X1 | β ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | α ∧ β ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ α ◦ β | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ α ∨ β | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | α X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | β
X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | α ∨ β
α | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4 β | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
α ∨ β | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | α ◦ β ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | α ∨ β ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 ◦ α | X2 ⇒ β | I
X1 | X2 ⇒ α → β | I
X | X2 ⇒ α | I Y | X2 ⇒ I | β
X ◦ Y | X2 ⇒ I | α → β
X1 | X2 ⇒ α | X4 β | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
α → β | X2 ◦ ∗X1 ⇒ X3 | X4
α ◦ ∗β | ∗X1 ⇒ X3 | X4
X1 | α → β ⇒ X3 | X4
Observation 3.23. For any formula α fromLN4 ∪{⊥}: δN4⊥ ⊢ I | α ⇒ I | α and δN4⊥ ⊢ α | I⇒ α | I.
Proof. By induction on the structure of α. 
Two sequents are said to be structurally equivalent if they are interderivable by means of display postulates only. It
is characteristic of display calculi that any substructure of a given sequent may be displayed as the entire antecedent or
succedent of a structurally equivalent sequent. In the case of δN4⊥, a distinction is drawn between odd and even positions
of the antecedent and the succedent. An occurrence of a substructure in a given structure is said to be positive (negative) iff
it is in the scope of an even (uneven) number of ∗’s. An o-antecedent (e-antecedent) part of a sequent X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
is a positive occurrence of a substructure of X1 or a negative occurrence of substructure of X2 (a positive occurrence of a
substructure of X2 or a negative occurrence of substructure of X1). An o-succedent (e-succedent) part of X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
is a positive occurrence of a substructure of X3 or a negative occurrence of substructure of X4 (a positive occurrence of a
substructure of X4 or a negative occurrence of substructure of X3).
Theorem 3.24 ([10]). For every sequent s and every o-antecedent (e-antecedent) part X of s, there exists a sequent s′ structurally
equivalent to s such that X is the entire o-antecedent (e-antecedent) of s′. For every sequent s and every o-succedent (e-succedent)
part X of s, there exists a sequent s′ structurally equivalent to s such that X is the entire o-succedent (e-succedent) of s′.
We use ⊤ as an abbreviation of p → p for some propositional variable p and define a translation τ from sequents into
formulas of δN4⊥ as follows:
τ(X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4) := (t1(X1) ∧ τ2(X2))→ (τ3(X3) ∨ τ4(X4)),
where ti (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is defined as follows:
τ1(α) := τ3(α) = α,
τ2(α) := τ4(α) = ∼α,
τ1(I) := τ2(I) = ⊤,





τ1(X ◦ Y ) := t1(X) ∧ t1(Y ),
τ2(X ◦ Y ) := t2(X) ∧ t2(Y ),
τ3(X ◦ Y ) := t3(X) ∨ t3(Y ),
τ4(X ◦ Y ) := t4(X) ∨ t4(Y ).
Theorem 3.25. For any formula α from HN4⊥:
(i) HN4⊥ ⊢ α implies δN4⊥ ⊢ I | I⇒ α | I.
(ii) δN4⊥ ⊢ X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4 implies HN4⊥ ⊢ τ(X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4).
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Proof. (i) By induction on proofs in HN4⊥. We present some cases and use vertical dots to indicate a series of applications
of display postulates and other structural rules.
Axiom schemes⊥→ α and α →∼⊥:
⊥ | I⇒ α | I
I ◦ ⊥ | I⇒ α | I
I | I⇒ ⊥→ α | I
I ◦ α | I⇒ ∗I | ⊥
...
I ◦ α | I⇒ ∗⊥ | I
I ◦ α | I⇒ ∼⊥ | I
I | I⇒ α →∼⊥ | I
Axiom scheme∼(α ∨ β)↔ ∼α ∧∼β:
I | α ⇒ I | α
I | α ◦ β ⇒ I | α
I | α ∨ β ⇒ I | α
...
∗(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∗α | I
∗(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∼α | I
∼(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∼α | I
I | β ⇒ I | β
I | α ◦ β ⇒ I | β
I | α ∨ β ⇒ I | β
...
∗(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∗β | I
∗(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∼β | I
∼(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∼β | I
∼(α ∨ β) ◦ ∼(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∼α ∧∼β | I
∼(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∼α ∧∼β | I
I ◦ ∼(α ∨ β) | I⇒ ∼α ∧∼β | I
I | I⇒ ∼(α ∨ β)→ (∼α ∧∼β) | I
I | α ⇒ I | α I | β ⇒ I | β
I | α ◦ β ⇒ I | α ∨ β
...
∗β | α ⇒ I | α ∨ β
∼β | α ⇒ I | α ∨ β
...
∗α | ∗∼β ⇒ I | α ∨ β
∼α | ∗∼β ⇒ I | α ∨ β
...
∼α ◦ ∼β | I⇒ ∗(α ∨ β) | I
∼α ∧∼β | I⇒ ∗(α ∨ β) | I
∼α ∧∼β | I⇒ ∼(α ∨ β) | I
I ◦ (∼α ∧∼β) | I⇒ ∼(α ∨ β) | I
I | I⇒ (∼α ∧∼β)→∼(α ∨ β) | I
Axiom scheme (α → (β → γ ))→ ((α → β)→ (α → γ )):
α | I⇒ α | I
α | I ◦ (∗(α → β) ◦ ∗α)⇒ α | I
α | ∗(α → β) ◦ ∗α ⇒ α | I
α | I⇒ α | I
α | I ◦ ∗(β → γ )⇒ α | I
α | ∗(β → γ )⇒ α | I
β | I⇒ β | I γ | I⇒ γ | I
β → γ | I ◦ ∗β ⇒ γ | I
...
β | ∗(β → γ )⇒ γ | I
α → β | ∗(β → γ ) ◦ ∗α ⇒ γ | I
...
β → γ | ∗(α → β) ◦ ∗α ⇒ γ | I
(α → (β → γ ) | (∗(α → β)) ◦ ∗α) ◦ ∗α ⇒ γ | I
...
(((α → (β → γ )) ◦ (α → β)) ◦ α) ◦ α | I⇒ γ | I
((α → (β → γ )) ◦ (α → β)) ◦ α | I⇒ γ | I
(α → (β → γ )) ◦ (α → β) | I⇒ α → γ | I
(α → (β → γ )) | I⇒ (α → β)→ (α → γ ) | I
I ◦ (α → (β → γ )) | I⇒ (α → β)→ (α → γ ) | I
I | I⇒ (α → (β → γ ))→ ((α → β)→ (α → γ )) | I
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Axiom scheme (α → β)→ ((α → γ )→ (α → (β ∧ γ ))):
α | I⇒ α | I β | I⇒ β | I
α → β | I ◦ ∗α ⇒ β | I
...
((α → β) ◦ (α → γ )) ◦ α | I⇒ β | I
α | I⇒ α | I γ | I⇒ γ | I.
α → γ | I ◦ ∗α ⇒ γ | I
...
((α → β) ◦ (α → γ )) ◦ α | I⇒ γ | I
(((α → β) ◦ (α → γ )) ◦ α) ◦ (((α → β) ◦ (α → γ )) ◦ α) | I⇒ β ∧ γ | I
((α → β) ◦ (α → γ )) ◦ α | I⇒ β ∧ γ | I
(α → β) ◦ (α → γ ) | I⇒ α → (β ∧ γ ) | I
α → β | I⇒ ((α → γ )→ (α → (β ∧ γ ))) | I
I ◦ (α → β) | I⇒ ((α → γ )→ (α → (β ∧ γ ))) | I
I | I⇒ (α → β)→ ((α → γ )→ (α → (β ∧ γ ))) | I
Axiom scheme (α → γ )→ ((β → γ )→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ )):
α | I⇒ α | I γ | I⇒ γ | I
α → γ | I ◦ ∗α ⇒ γ | I
...
α | ∗(α → γ )⇒ γ | I
α | ∗(α → γ ) ◦ ∗(β → γ )⇒ γ | I
β | I⇒ β | I γ | I⇒ γ | I.
β → γ | I ◦ ∗β ⇒ γ | I
...
β | ∗(β → γ )⇒ γ | I
β | ∗(α → γ ) ◦ ∗(β → γ )⇒ γ | I
α ∨ β | ∗(α → γ ) ◦ ∗(β → γ )⇒ γ ◦ γ | I
...
((α → γ ) ◦ (β → γ )) ◦ (α ∨ β) | I⇒ γ ◦ γ | I
((α → γ ) ◦ (β → γ )) ◦ (α ∨ β) | I⇒ γ | I
(α → γ ) ◦ (β → γ ) | I⇒ (α ∨ β)→ γ | I
α → γ | I⇒ (β → γ )→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ ) | I
I ◦ (α → γ ) | I⇒ (β → γ )→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ ) | I
I | I⇒ (α → γ )→ ((β → γ )→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ )) | I
Modus ponens: By the induction hypothesis, δN4⊥ ⊢ I | I⇒ α | I and δN4⊥ ⊢ I | I⇒ α → β | I. We have:
I | I⇒ α | I I | I⇒ α → β | I
I ◦ I | I⇒ α ∧ (α → β) | I
I | I⇒ α ∧ (α → β) | I
α | I⇒ α | I β | I⇒ β | I
α → β | I ◦ ∗α ⇒ β | I
α ◦ (α → β) | I⇒ β | I
α ∧ (α → β) | I⇒ β | I
I | I ◦ I⇒ β | I ◦ I
I | I⇒ β | I ◦ I
I | I⇒ β | I
(ii) It is enough to show by induction on proofs in δN4⊥ that δN4⊥ ⊢ X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4 implies the validity of the formula
τ(X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4) in every Kripke model of Section 2.2 with the additional clauses
[not x |=+ ⊥] and x |=− ⊥.
The completeness of HN4⊥with respect to the Kripke semantics follows from a generalization of Theorem 2.17 by extending
the mapping f as follows: f (⊥) := ⊥ and f (∼⊥) := ⊤.
Initial sequents: The τ -translations (p ∧⊤)→ (p ∨⊥) and (⊤∧ ∼ p)→ (⊥∨ ∼ p) of initial sequents are clearly valid.
Display postulates: Consider X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4 ◦ Y ⊢ X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 ◦ ∗Y | X4 and suppose (τ1(X1) ∧ τ2(X2)) ⇒ (τ3(X3) ∨
τ4(X4) ∨ τ4(Y )) is valid. It is enough to note that τ3(∗Y ) = τ4(Y ).
Case {X1 | α ⇒ X3 | X4, X1 | β ⇒ X3 | X4} ⊢ X1 | α ∧ β ⇒ X3 | X4. Let (1) (τ1(X1) ∧∼α)→ (τ3(X3) ∨ τ4(X4)) be valid, let
(2) (τ1(X1) ∧∼β)→ (τ3(X3) ∨ τ4(X4)) be valid, and let ⟨M, R, |=+, |=−⟩ be a model and x ∈ M . Suppose that x |=+ τ1(X1)
and x |=+ ∼(α ∧ β). Then x |=+ ∼α or x |=+ ∼β . In both cases, either by (1) or by (2), x |=+ τ3(X3) ∨ τ4(X4).
Case {X1 | X2 ⇒ α | X4, β | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4} ⊢ α → β | X2 ◦ ∗X1 ⇒ X3 | X4. Let (1) (τ1(X1) ∧ τ2(X)) → (α ∨ τ4(X4))
be valid, let (2) (β ∧ τ2(X2)) → (τ3(X3) ∨ τ4(X4)) be valid, and let ⟨M, R, |=+, |=−⟩ be a model and x ∈ M . Suppose that
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(3) x |=+ α → β x |=+ τ2(X2) and x |=+ τ2(∗X1). Then x |=+ τ1(X1). By (1), x |=+ α or x |=+ τ4(X4). In the latter case,
x |=+ τ3(X3) ∨ τ4(X4). In the former case, x |=+ β , by (3). It follows from (2) that x |=+ τ3(X3) ∨ τ4(X4). 
Corollary 3.26. For any formula α from HN4⊥: HN4⊥ ⊢ α iff δN4⊥ ⊢ I | I⇒ α | I.
Belnap [10] presents a very general cut-elimination theorem covering all so-called properly displayable logics, which
are logics satisfying a number of conditions (C1)–(C8). The conditions (C1)–(C8) are stated for binary sequents of the shape
X ⇒ Y but can easily be restated for sequents X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4. Conditions (C6) and (C7), for example, stipulate that
each rule is closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary structures for congruent formulas which are succedent
parts, respectively antecedent parts. Instead of these requirements it has to be postulated that each rule is closed under
simultaneous substitution of arbitrary structures for congruent formulas which are o-succedent parts, e-succedent parts,
o-antecedent parts, and e-antecedent parts, respectively. Analogous adjustments have to be made to conditions (C4) and
(C5). Conditions (C1)–(C7) can be checkedbymere inspection of the rules. (C8) is the requirement of eliminability of principal
cuts, i.e., applications of (cut) in the form
X ⇒ α α ⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y
or of (odd cut) and (even cut) in which the two premise sequents have been obtained by introducing the main connective
of the cut-formula α.
Theorem 3.27. If δN4⊥ ⊢ X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4, then δN4⊥ − {(odd cut), (even cut)} ⊢ X1 | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4.
Proof. It is enough to note that δN4⊥ satisfies conditions (C1)–(C8). For (C8) we have, for example:
X1 | X2 ⇒ I | X4
X1 | X2 ⇒ ⊥ | X4 ⊥ | X ′2 ⇒ X3 | X ′4
X1 | X2 ◦ X ′2 ⇒ X3 | X4 ◦ X ′4 is replaced by
X1 | X2 ⇒ I | X4
X1 ◦ ∗X ′2 | X2 ⇒ I | X4
X1 | X2 ◦ X ′2 ⇒ I | X4
X1 | X2 ◦ X ′2 ⇒ I ◦ (X3 ◦ ∗X ′4) | X4
X1 | X2 ◦ X ′2 ⇒ X3 ◦ ∗X ′4 | X4
X1 | X2 ◦ X ′2 ⇒ X3 | X4 ◦ X ′4
X ′1 ◦ α | X ′2 ⇒ β | I
X ′1 | X ′2 ⇒ α → β | I
X1 | X2 ⇒ α | X4 β | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
α → β | X2 ◦ ∗X1 ⇒ X3 | X4
X ′1 | X ′2 ◦ (X2 ◦ ∗X1)⇒ X3 | I ◦ X4 is replaced by
X1 | X2 ⇒ α | X4
X ′1 ◦ α | X ′2 ⇒ β | I β | X2 ⇒ X3 | X4
X ′1 ◦ α | (X ′2 ◦ X2)⇒ X3 | I ◦ X4
α | (X ′2 ◦ X2) ◦ ∗X ′1 ⇒ X3 | I ◦ X4
X1 | X2 ◦ ((X ′2 ◦ X2) ◦ ∗X ′1)⇒ X3 | X4 ◦ (I ◦ X4)
...
∗X2 ◦ ∗X2 | ((X ′2 ◦ ∗X ′1) ◦ ∗X1)⇒ ∗X4 ◦ ∗X4 | I ◦ ∗X3
∗X2 | ((X ′2 ◦ ∗X ′1) ◦ ∗X1)⇒ ∗X4 ◦ ∗X4 | I ◦ ∗X3
∗X2 | ((X ′2 ◦ ∗X ′1) ◦ ∗X1)⇒ ∗X4 | I ◦ ∗X3
...
X ′1 | X ′2 ◦ (X2 ◦ ∗X1)⇒ X3 | I ◦ X4 
In Section 1.2 (on page 2) we mentioned Heyting–Brouwer logic H–B as a logic closely related to Nelson’s four-valued
logic. Rauszer’s sequent calculus G1 [54] for H–B logic is presented below. The language of G1 includes→,− (the dual of
→), ¬ and−(co-negation, the dual of ¬). Note that in the presence of both→ and− , the two negations are definable as
follows:
¬α := α →⊥, −α := ⊤−α,
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where for some arbitrary but fixed propositional variable p, ⊥ is defined as p− p and ⊤ is defined as p → p. Note also
that whereas intuitionistic negation is paracomplete in the sense that⇒ (α∨¬α) fails to be provable in G1, co-negation is
paraconsistent in the sense that⇒ −(−α ∧ α) fails to be provable in G1.
Definition 3.28 (Rauszer’s G1 for H–B Logic [54]). An expressionΓ is used to represent a sequence of formulas. The sequents
of G1 are of the form Γ ⇒ ∆with the one-element restriction: Γ and∆ cannot be sequences with more than one-element
simultaneously.
The initial sequents of G1 are of the form:
α ⇒ α.
The inference rules of G1 are of the form:
Γ ⇒ Σ, α α,∆⇒ Π
Γ ,∆⇒ Σ,Π ∗
Γ , β, α,∆⇒ γ
Γ , α, β,∆⇒ γ
α, α,Γ ⇒ γ
α,Γ ⇒ γ
Γ ⇒ ∆
α,Γ ⇒ ∆ ∗
γ ⇒ Γ , β, α,∆
γ ⇒ Γ , α, β,∆
γ ⇒ Γ , α, α
γ ⇒ Γ , α
Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆, α ∗
Γ ⇒ ∆, α Γ ⇒ ∆, β
Γ ⇒ ∆, α ∧ β ∗
α, β,Γ ⇒ γ
α ∧ β,Γ ⇒ γ
α ⇒ ∆
α ∧ β ⇒ ∆
β ⇒ ∆
α ∧ β ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β
Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β
γ ⇒ Γ , α, β
γ ⇒ Γ , α ∨ β
α,Γ ⇒ ∆ β,Γ ⇒ ∆
α ∨ β,Γ ⇒ ∆ ∗
α,Γ ⇒
Γ ⇒ ¬α
Γ ⇒ ∆, α
¬α,Γ ⇒ ∆ ∗
α,Γ ⇒ ∆





Γ ,∆⇒ α β,Γ ,∆⇒ γ
α→β,Γ ,∆⇒ γ
γ ⇒ Σ,∆, α β ⇒ Σ,∆
γ ⇒ Σ,∆, α−β α ⇒ ∆, βα−β ⇒ ∆
where ‘‘∗’’ means that the rule has the one-element restriction.
It is known that the cut-elimination theorem for G1 does not hold, a counterexample due to T. Uustalu, namely the for-
mula p → (q ∨ (r → ((p− q) ∧ r)), is presented in [12]. The sequent calculus for Heyting–Brouwer logic in [15] uses
single-conclusion sequents but imposes a singleton-on-the-left restriction on the left introduction rule for co-implication
and a singleton-on-the-right constraint on the right introduction rule for implication. Uustalu’s counterexample also shows
that this calculus is not cut-free. A sequent calculus for Heyting–Brouwer logic that admits cut-elimination can be found in
[25], and Buisman and Goré [12] present a non-standard cut-free sequent calculus for H–B. In this proof system, the sequent
rule for implications in succedent position of a sequent and the rule for co-implications in antecedent position of a sequent
have side conditions on variables for families of sets of formulas. Two other, cut-free sequent calculi for Heyting–Brouwer
logic are presented in [26]. The first calculus is intermediate between display calculi and standard sequent systems. From this
system a variant is defined, which is amenable to automated proof-search. A cut-elimination admitting display sequent cal-
culus for certain conservative extensions of H–B by several versions of strong negationmay be found in [73].Wewill present
the fragment of the latter system equivalent with G1. This display calculus, δHB, is a variant of Goré’s system [25]. Whereas
Goré [25] treats the pair of commutative operations∧ and∨ as Gentzen duals and the non-commutative operations→ and
− , the display sequent calculus δHB uses the residuated pairs (∧,→) and (− ,∨) as pairs of Gentzen duals.Wewill use the
binary operations ◦ and • as structural connectives. In antecedent position, ◦ is to be interpreted as conjunction and in succe-
dent position as implication. In antecedent position, • is to be read as co-implication and in succedent position as disjunction.
A sequent is an expression of the form X ⇒ Y , where X and Y are structures. We also assume the structure constant I.
Definition 3.29. LetLH–B be the set of all H–B-formulas. The set of structures Struc(LH–B) generated fromLH–B is defined
as follows:
formulas: α ∈ LH–B
structures: X ∈ Struc(LH–B)
X ::= α | I | (X ◦ X) | (X • X).
Definition 3.30 (Display Calculus δHB). The initial sequents of δHB are of the form: for any propositional variable p,
p ⇒ p.
The display postulates of δHB are of the form:
Y ⇒ X ◦ Z
X ◦ Y ⇒ Z
X ⇒ Y ◦ Z
X ⇒ Y ◦ Z
X ◦ Y ⇒ Z
Y ⇒ X ◦ Z
X • Z ⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y • Z
X • Y ⇒ Z
X • Y ⇒ Z
X ⇒ Y • Z
X • Z ⇒ Y .
where two rules are combined into a single one at a time.
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The additional structural rules of δHB are of the form:
X ⇒ α α ⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y (cut)
X ◦ I⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y
I ◦ X ⇒ Y
I ◦ X ⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y
X ◦ I⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y • I
X ⇒ Y
X ⇒ I • Y
X ⇒ I • Y
X ⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y • I
X ⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y • Z (rm)
X ⇒ Y
X ◦ Z ⇒ Y (lm)
X ⇒ Y • Z
X ⇒ Z • Y (re)
X ◦ Z ⇒ Y
Z ◦ X ⇒ Y (le)
X ⇒ Y • Y
X ⇒ Y (rc)
X ◦ X ⇒ Y
X ⇒ Y (lc)
X ⇒ (Y • Z) • X ′
X ⇒ Y • (Z • X ′) (ra)
(X ◦ Y ) ◦ Z ⇒ X ′
X ◦ (Y ◦ Z)⇒ X ′ (la)
The introduction rules of δHB are of the form:
X ⇒ α Y ⇒ β
X ◦ Y ⇒ (α ∧ β) (⇒ ∧)
α ◦ β ⇒ X
(α ∧ β)⇒ X (∧ ⇒)
X ⇒ α • β
X ⇒ (α ∨ β) (⇒ ∨)
α ⇒ X β ⇒ Y
(α ∨ β)⇒ X • Y (∨ ⇒)
X ⇒ α ◦ β
X ⇒ (α → β) (⇒→)
X ⇒ α β ⇒ Y
(α → β)⇒ X ◦ Y (→⇒)
X ⇒ β α ⇒ Y
X • Y ⇒ β−α (⇒ − ) β • α ⇒ Xβ−α ⇒ X (− ⇒)
Definition 3.31. If s= X ⇒ Y is a sequent, then the displayed occurrence of X (Y ) is an antecedent (succedent) part of s. If
an occurrence of (Z ◦W ) is an antecedent part of s, then the displayed occurrences of Z andW are antecedent parts of s. If
an occurrence of (Z •W ) is an antecedent part of s, then the displayed occurrence of Z (W ) is an antecedent (succedent) part
of s. If an occurrence of (Z ◦W ) is a succedent part of s, then the displayed occurrence of Z (W ) is an antecedent (succedent)
part of s. If an occurrence of (Z •W ) is a succedent part of s, then the displayed occurrences of Z andW are succedent parts
of s.
Theorem 3.32 ([10]). For every sequent s and every antecedent (succedent) part X of s, there exists a sequent s′ structurally
equivalent to s such that X is the entire antecedent (succedent) of s′.
By induction on the structure of H–B-formulas α, it can be shown that for every H–B-formula α, δHB ⊢ α ⇒ α.
One can define translations τ1 and τ2 from structures into formulas such that these translations reflect the context-
sensitive interpretation of the structure connectives: τ1 translates structures in antecedent position and τ2 in succedent
position.
Definition 3.33. The translations τ1 and τ2 from structures into H–B-formulas are inductively defined as follows, where α
is a formula and p is an arbitrary but fixed propositional variable:
τ1(α) = α τ2(α) = α
τ1(I) = p → p τ2(I) = p− p
τ1(X ◦ Y ) = τ1(X) ∧ τ1(Y ) τ2(X ◦ Y ) = τ1(X)→ τ2(Y )
τ1(X • Y ) = τ1(X)− τ2(Y ) τ2(X • Y ) = τ2(X) ∨ τ2(Y )
Theorem 3.34 (Soundness of δHB). For every sequent X ⇒ Y , if δHB ⊢ X ⇒ Y , then G1 ⊢ τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ).
Proof. By induction on proofs in δHB. For initial sequents the claim is obvious.We here present some of the remaining cases.
Case X • Y ⇒ Z ⊢ X ⇒ Y • Z: By the induction hypothesis, G1 ⊢ τ1(X • Y )⇒ τ2(Z), i.e., ⊢ τ1(X)− τ2(Y )⇒ τ2(Z). It has
to be shown that ⊢ τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y • Z), i.e., ⊢ τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ) ∨ τ2(Z). We have:
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τ1(X)⇒ τ1(X)
τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ), τ1(X) τ2(Y )⇒ τ2(Y )
τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ), τ1(X)− τ2(Y ) τ1(X)− τ2(Y )⇒ τ2(Z)
τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ), τ2(Z)
τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ) ∨ τ2(Z)
Case X ⇒ Y • Z ⊢ X • Z ⇒ Y : By the induction hypothesis, G1 ⊢ τ1(X) ⇒ τ2(Y ) ∨ τ2(Z). It has to be shown that
⊢ τ1(X)− τ2(Z)⇒ τ2(Y ). We have:
τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ) ∨ τ2(Z)
τ2(Y )⇒ τ2(Y )
τ2(Y )⇒ τ2(Y ), τ2(Z)
τ2(Z)⇒ τ2(Z)
τ2(Z)⇒ τ2(Y ), τ2(Z)
τ2(Y ) ∨ τ2(Z)⇒ τ2(Y ), τ2(Z)
τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ), τ2(Z)
τ1(X)− τ2(Z)⇒ τ2(Y )
Case X ⇒ Y • I ⊢ X ⇒ Y : By the induction hypothesis, G1 ⊢ τ1(X) ⇒ τ2(Y ) ∨ (p− p). It has to be shown that
⊢ τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ). We have:
τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ) ∨ (p− p) τ2(Y )⇒ τ2(Y )
p ⇒ p
p ⇒ τ2(Y ), p
p− p ⇒ τ2(Y )
τ2(Y ) ∨ (p− p)⇒ τ2(Y )
τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y )
Case (⇒ − ): By the induction hypothesis, G1 ⊢ τ1(X)⇒ β , ⊢ α ⇒ τ2(Y ). We have:
τ1(X)⇒ β α ⇒ τ2(Y )
τ1(X) • τ2(Y )⇒ β−α
τ1(X)− τ2(Y )⇒ β−α 
In order to prove the converse of Theorem 3.34, we will apply two lemmas.
Lemma 3.35. The sequent ¬α ⇒ −α is derivable in δHB.
Proof. The proof follows the pattern of the cut-free derivation in [25], Figure 4. 
Definition 3.36. If Γ ⇒ ∆ is a sequent of G1 then h(Γ ⇒ ∆) is defined as the sequent h(Γ )⇒ h(∆) of δHB, where
h(Γ ) =

α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn if Γ ≡ α1, . . . , αn and n > 1
α if Γ ≡ α
p → p if Γ is the empty sequence
h(∆) =

β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βm if∆ ≡ β1, . . . , βm andm > 1
β if Γ ≡ β
p− p if∆ is the empty sequence
and p is the fixed propositional variable from Lemma 3.33.
Lemma 3.37. For every sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ of G1, if G1 ⊢ Γ ⇒ ∆, then δHB ⊢ h(Γ )⇒ h(∆).
Proof. By induction on proofs in G1. For initial sequents the claim is obvious. We here present some of the remaining cases.
Case
Γ ⇒ Σ, α α,∆⇒ Π
Γ ,∆⇒ Σ,Π ∗ :
Due to the one-element restriction, there are four subcases: (1) both Γ and ∆ are the empty sequence, (2) both Γ and Π
are the empty sequence, (3) bothΣ and∆ are the empty sequence, or (4) bothΣ andΠ are the empty sequence. We here
present Subcase (1). By the induction hypothesis, δHB ⊢ I⇒ h(Σ) ∨ α and δHB ⊢ α ⇒ h(Π). We have:
I⇒ h(Σ) ∨ α
h(Σ)⇒ h(Σ) α ⇒ α
h(Σ) ∨ α ⇒ h(Σ) • α
I⇒ h(Σ) • α
I • h(Σ)⇒ α α ⇒ h(Π)
I • h(Σ)⇒ h(Π)
I⇒ h(Σ) • h(Π)
I⇒ h(Σ) ∨ h(Π)
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Case ⇒ ∆, α ⊢ −α ⇒ ∆: By the induction hypothesis, δHB ⊢ p → p ⇒ h(∆) ∨ α. It has to be shown that δHB
⊢ (p → p)−α ⇒ h(∆). We have:
p → p ⇒ h(∆) ∨ α
h(∆)⇒ h(∆) α ⇒ α
h(∆) ∨ α ⇒ h(∆) • α
(p → p)⇒ h(∆) • α
(p → p) • α ⇒ h(∆)
(p → p)−α ⇒ h(∆)
Case Γ ⇒ ∆, α ⊢ ¬α,Γ ⇒ ∆ ∗: Due to the one-element restriction, Γ or ∆ are the empty sequence. Suppose
Γ is the empty sequence. By the induction hypothesis, δHB ⊢ p → p ⇒ h(∆) ∨ α. It has to be shown that δHB
⊢ α → (p− p)⇒ h(∆). We have:
α → (p− p)⇒ (p → p)−α
p → p ⇒ h(∆) ∨ α
h(∆)⇒ h(∆) α ⇒ α
h(∆) ∨ α ⇒ h(∆) • α
p → p ⇒ h(∆) • α
(p → p) • α ⇒ h(∆)
(p → p)−α ⇒ h(∆)
α → (p− p)⇒ (h(∆)) (cut), Lemma 3.35
Suppose ∆ is the empty sequence. By the induction hypothesis, δHB ⊢ h(Γ ) ⇒ α. It has to be shown that δHB ⊢ (α →
(p− p)) ∧ h(Γ )⇒ p− p. We have:
h(Γ )⇒ α
α ⇒ α p− p ⇒ p− p
α → (p− p)⇒ α ◦ (p− p)
α ◦ (α → (p− p))⇒ p− p
α ⇒ (α → (p− p)) ◦ (p− p)
h(Γ )⇒ (α → (p− p)) ◦ (p− p)
(α → (p− p)) ◦ h(Γ )⇒ p− p
(α → (p− p)) ∧ h(Γ )⇒ p− p 
Theorem 3.38 (Completeness of δHB). For every sequent X ⇒ Y of δHB, if G1 ⊢ τ1(X)⇒ τ2(Y ), then δHB ⊢ X ⇒ Y .
Proof. Suppose G1 ⊢ τ1(X) ⇒ τ2(Y ). By Lemma 3.37, G1 ⊢ h(τ1(X)) ⇒ h(τ2(Y )). But h(τ1(X)) ⇒ h(τ2(Y )) ≡ τ1(X) ⇒
τ2(Y ). 
Corollary 3.39. For every H–B-formula α, δHB ⊢ I⇒ α iff G1 ⊢ ⇒ α.
Proof. By Theorems 3.34 and 3.38 and the observation that δHB ⊢ I ⇒ α iff δHB ⊢ p → p ⇒ α and G1 ⊢ ⇒ α iff G1
⊢ p → p ⇒ α. 
Theorem 3.40. If δHB ⊢ X ⇒ Y , then δHB−(cut) ⊢ X ⇒ Y .
It is enough to note that δHB satisfies Belnap’s conditions (C1)–(C8). The principal cut-elimination step for− is:
X ⇒ B A ⇒ Y
X • Y ⇒ B− A B • A ⇒ ZB− A ⇒ Z
X • Y ⇒ Z is replaced by
X ⇒ β
β • α ⇒ Z
β ⇒ α • Z
X ⇒ α • Z
X • Z ⇒ α α ⇒ Y
X • Z ⇒ Y
X ⇒ Z ⇒ Y
X • Y ⇒ Z 
3.5. Other systems
As mentioned before, it is known that the following logics are the same logic: the→-free fragment of N4, Belnap and
Dunn’s four-valued logic and Anderson and Belnap’s logic Efde of first-degree entailment. In the following, we present some
sequent calculi for the logic. Unless stated otherwise, in this subsection uppercase Greek letters Γ , ∆ etc. in the sequent
expressions are used to represent finite sequences of formulas.
Definition 3.41 (Pynko’s GB [52]). The sequents of GB are of the form: Γ ⇒ ∆ with the non-emptiness restriction: both
sequences Γ and∆ are non-empty.
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The initial sequents of GB are of the form:
Γ , α,∆⇒ Σ, α,Π .
The inference rules of GB are of the form:
Γ , α, β,∆⇒ Π
Γ , α ∧ β,∆⇒ Π
Γ ⇒ ∆, α,Σ Γ ⇒ ∆, β,Σ
Γ ⇒ ∆, α ∧ β,Σ
Γ , α,∆⇒ Π Γ , β,∆⇒ Π
Γ , α ∨ β,∆⇒ Π
Γ ⇒ ∆, α, β,Σ
Γ ⇒ ∆, α ∨ β,Σ
Γ , α,∆⇒ Π
Γ ,∼∼α,∆⇒ Π
Γ ⇒ ∆, α,Σ
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼∼α,Σ
Γ ,∼α,∆⇒ Π Γ ,∼β,∆⇒ Π
Γ ,∼(α ∧ β),∆⇒ Π
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼α,∼β,Σ
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼(α ∧ β),Σ
Γ ,∼α,∼β,∆⇒ Π
Γ ,∼(α ∨ β),∆⇒ Π
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼α,Σ Γ ⇒ ∆,∼β,Σ
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼(α ∨ β),Σ .
It was shown in [52] that all the structural rules are admissible in GB.
Definition 3.42 (LEfde2 [2] pp. 179–180.). A sequent calculus LEfde2 for Anderson and Belnap’s first-degree entailment Efde (or
equivalently Rfde) is obtained from GB in Definition 3.41 by deleting the non-empty sequent restriction and by adding the
inference rule (for an implication connective) of the form:
α ⇒ β
⇒ α→β (→right).
Definition 3.43 (LEfde1 [2] pp. 177–178.). An expression α⋆ is the result of adding a sign of negation to α if the number of
outer negation signs on α is even (or zero), or the result of removing a sign of negation from α if the number is odd. We
remark that α⋆⋆ is the same formula as α. An expression Γ ⋆ is the sequence obtained from Γ by replacing each member α
of Γ by α⋆.
LEfde1 is obtained from the {∧,∨}-fragment of Gentzen’s LK (with the right weakening rule) for classical logic by adding
(→right) in Definition 3.42 and the inference rules of the form:
Γ ⇒ ∆
∆⋆ ⇒ Γ ⋆
Γ , α ⇒ ∆
∆⋆ ⇒ Γ ⋆,∼α
Γ ⇒ ∆, α
∆⋆,∼α ⇒ Γ ⋆ .
It was shown by Dunn in [21] that we can obtain various important extensions of Efde by adding some axiom schemes:
1. Klfde = Efde + (α ∧∼α)→β (the first-degree entailment of Kleene),
2. LPfde = Efde + α→(β ∨∼β) (the first-degree entailment of Priest),
3. RMfde = Efde + (α ∧∼α)→(β ∨∼β) (the first-degree entailment of Dunn and McCall’s system RM (‘‘R-mingle’’)).
Definition 3.44 (Font and Verdú’s GFV [23]). The sequents ofGFV are of the formΓ ⇒ γ with the non-emptiness restriction:
Γ is a non-empty sequence.
The initial sequents of GFV are of the form:
α ⇒ α.
The inference rules of GFV are of the form:
Γ ⇒ α α,Γ ⇒ γ
Γ ⇒ γ
Γ , β, α,∆⇒ γ
Γ , α, β,∆⇒ γ




α, β,Γ ⇒ γ
α ∧ β,Γ ⇒ γ
Γ ⇒ α Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α ∧ β
α,Γ ⇒ γ β,Γ ⇒ γ
α ∨ β,Γ ⇒ γ
Γ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β
Γ ⇒ β






∼β ⇒ ∼α .
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A sequent calculus (called here BL) for Arieli and Avron’s bilattice logic is presented below.
Definition 3.45 (Arieli and Avron’s Bilattice Logic [5,6]). An expressionΓ is used to represent a set of formulas. The sequents
of BL are of the form Γ ⇒ ∆.
The initial sequents of BL are of the form:
α ⇒ α.
The inference rules of BL are of the form:





Γ ⇒ ∆, α
Γ ⇒ ∆, α β,Γ ⇒ ∆
α→β,Γ ⇒ ∆
α,Γ ⇒ ∆, β
Γ ⇒ ∆, α→β (→R)
α,Γ ⇒ ∆
α ∧ β,Γ ⇒ ∆
β,Γ ⇒ ∆
α ∧ β,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆, α Γ ⇒ ∆, β
Γ ⇒ ∆, α ∧ β
α,Γ ⇒ ∆ β,Γ ⇒ ∆
α ∨ β,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆, α
Γ ⇒ ∆, α ∨ β
Γ ⇒ ∆, β
Γ ⇒ ∆, α ∨ β
α,Γ ⇒ ∆
∼∼α,Γ ⇒ ∆ (∼L)






Γ ⇒ ∆, α Γ ⇒ ∆,∼β
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼(α→β)
∼α,Γ ⇒ ∆ ∼β,Γ ⇒ ∆
∼(α ∧ β),Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼α
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼(α ∧ β)
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼β
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼(α ∧ β)
∼α,Γ ⇒ ∆
∼(α ∨ β),Γ ⇒ ∆
∼β,Γ ⇒ ∆
∼(α ∨ β),Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼α Γ ⇒ ∆,∼β
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼(α ∨ β) .
As mentioned in [8], an alternative sequent calculus for N4 is obtained from BL by replacing (→R) of BL with (→r) of
N4. A sequent calculus for the paraconsistent logic Cmin studied by Carnielli and Marcos in [14] is obtained from the∼-free
fragment of BL by adding (∼L) and the rule of the form:
α,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆,∼α .
Roughly speaking, an intuitionistic version of Cmin is Raggio’s formulation [53] of da Costa’s well-known paraconsistent logic
Cω [17].
4. Natural deduction
In this section, we consider a variety of natural deduction proof system for Nelson’s four-valued logic, see also [30].
4.1. Natural deduction in standard style








α1 ∧ α2 (∧I)
α1 ∧ α2
α1
(∧E1) α1 ∧ α2α2 (∧E2)
α1
α1 ∨ α2 (∨I1)
α2
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∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ I)
∼(α ∧ β)
∼α ∨∼β (∼∧ E)
∼α ∧∼β
∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨ I)
∼(α ∨ β)
∼α ∧∼β (∼∨ E).
The→-free part of NN4 is Priest’s system [50] for Efde. Note that the inference rules (∼I), (∼E), (∼→I), (∼→E), (∼ ∧ I),
(∼ ∧ E), (∼ ∨ I) and (∼ ∨ E) correspond to the Hilbert-style axiom schemes: ∼∼α ↔ α, ∼(α→β) ↔ α ∧ ∼β ,
∼(α ∧ β) ↔ ∼α ∨ ∼β and ∼(α ∨ β) ↔ ∼α ∧ ∼β , and also correspond to the definition of the ∼-part of the typed
λ-terms for Wansing’s λc [70]. It is also noted that the ∼-free part of NN4 is identical to the natural deduction system for
positive propositional intuitionistic logic.
The inference rules (→I), (∧I), (∨I1), (∨I2), (∼I), (∼→I), (∼∧I), and (∼∨I) are called introduction rules, and the inference
rules (→E), (∧E1), (∧E2), (∨E), (∼E), (∼→E), (∼ ∧ E) and (∼ ∨ E) are called elimination rules. The usual terminologies of
major or minor premise of inference rules are used. The notions of proof (of NN4), (open and discharged) assumptions of a proof,
and end-formula of a proof are also defined as usual and used. A formulaα is said to be provable in NN4 if there exists a proof of
NN4 with no open assumptionwhose end-formula is α. Similar terminologies and notions will also be used in other systems.
Definition 4.2. Let α be a formula occurring in a proof D in NN4. Then, α is called a maximum formula in D if α satisfies the
following conditions:
1. α is the conclusion of an introduction rule or (∨E),
2. α is the major premise of an elimination rule.
A proof is said to be normal if it contains no maximum formula.
In order to define a reduction relation ≻ on the set of proofs, we assume the usual definition of substitution for proofs
(for assumptions). The set of proofs is closed under substitutions.
Definition 4.3. Let γ be amaximum formula in a proof which is the conclusion of an inference rule R. The reduction relation
≻ at γ is defined as follows.



















where i is 1 or 2.
3. R is (∨I1) or (∨I2), and γ is α1 ∨ α2:
.... D
αi









where i is 1 or 2.
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where R′ is an arbitrary inference rule, and both E1 and E2 are proofs of the minor premises of R′ if they exist.













7. R is (∼∧ I), and γ is∼(α ∧ β):
.... D∼α ∨∼β
∼(α ∧ β) R
∼α ∨∼β ≻
.... D∼α ∨∼β
8. R is (∼∨ I), and γ is∼(α ∨ β):
.... D∼α ∧∼β
∼(α ∨ β) R
∼α ∧∼β ≻
.... D∼α ∧∼β
9. Let D,D′, E, F be proofs. If D≻ D′, then
D












α (∨E) ≻ D
′ E F




α (∨E) ≻ E F D
′
α (∨E)
where I ∈ {→I,∧E1,∧E2,∨I1, ∨I2,∼I,∼E,∼→I,∼→E,∼∧ I,∼∧ E,∼∨ I,∼∨ E} and R ∈ {→E,∧I}.3
Definition 4.4. A sequence D0,D1, . . . of proofs is called a reduction sequence if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. Di ≻ Di+1 for all i ≥ 0,
2. the last proof in the sequence is normal if the sequence is finite.
A proof D is called normalizable if there is a finite reduction sequence starting from D.
3 In Definition 4.3, the conditions 5–8 are taken from the following conditions in the definition of the reduction relation≻with respect toλc [70]:M∼∼α
≻Mα ,M∼(α→β) ≻Mα∧∼β ,M∼(α∧β) ≻M∼α∨∼β andM∼(α∨β) ≻M∼α∧∼β whereM is an arbitrary term and the superscripts are types.
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In order to consider a correspondence between NN4 and a sequent calculus, we introduce an alternative sequent calculus
SN4 for N4.
Definition 4.5 (SN4). An expression Γ is used in SN4 to represent a finite (possibly empty) set of formulas. A sequent for SN4
is an expression of the form Γ ⇒ γ . Then, SN4 is obtained from N4 by deleting (co).
SN4 enjoys cut-elimination, and is theorem equivalent to N4.
Let P be a natural deduction proof. The expression oa(P) denotes the set of open assumptions of P , and the expression
end(P) denotes the end-formula of P .
Theorem 4.6 (Equivalence Between NN4 and SN4). We have the following:
1. if P is a proof in NN4 such that oa(P)= Γ and end(P)= β , then SN4 ⊢ Γ ⇒ β ,
2. if SN4 − (cut) ⊢ Γ ⇒ β , then there is a proof Q in NN4 which satisfies the following conditions:
(a) oa(Q )= Γ ,
(b) end(Q )= β ,
(c) Q is normal.
Proof. • (1) By induction on the proofs P of NN4 such that oa(P) = Γ and end(P) = β . We distinguish the cases according
to the last inference of P . We show only the following case.





where oa(P) = Γ and end(P)= ∼(α→γ ). By the induction hypothesis, we have: SN4 ⊢ Γ ⇒ α ∧∼γ . Then, we have the
required fact:
....
Γ ⇒ α ∧∼γ
α ⇒ α
α,∼γ ⇒ α (we)
∼γ ⇒ ∼γ
α,∼γ ⇒ ∼γ (we)
α,∼γ ⇒ ∼(α→γ ) (∼→r)
α ∧∼γ ⇒ ∼(α→γ ) (∼→l)
Γ ⇒ ∼(α→γ ) (cut).
• (2) By induction on the proofs P of Γ ⇒ β in SN4 − (cut). We distinguish the cases according to the inference of P . We
show only the following case.





Γ ⇒ ∼(α→γ ) (∼→r).










where oa(Q )= Γ and end(Q )=∼(α→γ ). 
Theorem 4.7 (Normalization). All proofs in NN4 are normalizable. More precisely, if a proof P in NN4 is given, then there is a
normal proof Q such that oa(Q )= oa(P) and end(Q )= end(P).
Proof. Suppose oa(P)=Γ and end(P)=β . By Theorem4.6(1), the sequentΓ ⇒ β is provable in SN4. By the cut-elimination
theorem for SN4, the sequent Γ ⇒ β is also provable in SN4− (cut). Then, by Theorem 4.6(2), there is a normal proof Q in
NN4 such that oa(Q )= oa(P) and end(Q )= end(P). 
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4.2. Natural deduction in sequent calculus style
In this subsection, Greek capital letters Γ ,∆, . . . are used to represent finite (possibly empty) multisets of formulas. A
sequent is an expression of the form Γ ⇒ γ . In a multiset of formulas, n occurrences of a formula α are denoted by αn.
Definition 4.8. A multiset ∆ is called a multiset reduct of a multiset Γ if ∆ is obtained from Γ by multiplying formulas in
Γ , where zero multiplicity is also permitted. An expression Γ ∗ denotes a multiset reduct of Γ .
Definition 4.9 (Sequent Calculus in Natural Deduction Style, LN4). Letm, n≥ 0 be any natural numbers.
The initial sequents of LN4 are of the form:
α ⇒ α.
The cut rule of LN4 is of the form:
Γ ⇒ α α,Σ ⇒ γ
Γ ,Σ ⇒ γ (cut).
The logical inference rules of LN4 are of the form:
Γ ⇒ α βn,Σ ⇒ γ
α→β,Γ ,Σ ⇒ γ (→l
∗)
αm,Γ ⇒ β
Γ ⇒ α→β (→r
∗)
αm, βn,∆⇒ γ
α ∧ β,∆⇒ γ (∧l
∗)
Γ ⇒ α ∆⇒ β
Γ ,∆⇒ α ∧ β (∧r
∗)
αm,Γ ⇒ γ βn,∆⇒ γ
α ∨ β,Γ ,∆⇒ γ (∨l
∗)
Γ ⇒ α
Γ ⇒ α ∨ β (∨r1)
Γ ⇒ β








Γ ⇒ α ∆⇒ ∼β
Γ ,∆⇒ ∼(α→β) (∼→r
∗)
∼αm,Γ ⇒ γ ∼βn,∆⇒ γ
∼(α ∧ β),Γ ,∆⇒ γ (∼∧ l
∗)
Γ ⇒ ∼α
Γ ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ r1)
Γ ⇒ ∼β
Γ ⇒ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ r2)
∼αm,∼βn,∆⇒ γ
∼(α ∨ β),∆⇒ γ (∼∨ l
∗)
Γ ⇒ ∼α ∆⇒ ∼β
Γ ,∆⇒ ∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨ r
∗).
A sequent calculus LLJ for positive intuitionistic logic is defined as the∼-free fragment of LN4.
The superscript ·∗ in the inference rules of LN4 indicates that their forms differ from those of SN4. It can be shown that
a sequent⇒ α is provable in LN4 if and only if so is SN4. On the other hand, it cannot be shown that a sequent Γ ⇒ γ is
provable in LN4 if and only if so is SN4. For example, p ⇒ p ∧ p for a propositional variable p is provable in SN4, but it is not
provable in LN44. Note that the rule (∼l) is not the multiple occurrence form, but the same as that in SN4.
The following cut-elimination theorem is proved by Negri and von Plato [40]: For any sequent Γ ⇒ γ ,
if LLJ ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ , then LLJ − (cut) ⊢ Γ ∗ ⇒ γ where Γ ∗ is a multiset reduct of Γ .
Theorem 4.10 (Cut-Elimination). For any sequent Γ ⇒ γ ,
if LN4 ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ , then LN4 − (cut) ⊢ Γ ∗ ⇒ γ where Γ ∗ is a multiset reduct of Γ .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.5. We use the cut-elimination theorem for LLJ . 
The notations used for LN4 are also adopted for a natural deduction system GN4 introduced below.
4 This fact is guaranteed by the cut-elimination theorem for LN4 , which will be proved.
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Definition 4.11 (Natural Deduction System in Sequent Calculus Style, GN4). Letm, n ≥ 0 be any natural numbers.
The axioms of GN4 are of the form:
α ⊢ α.
The inference rules of GN4 are of the form:
αm,Γ ⊢ β
Γ ⊢ α→β (→IG)
Π ⊢ α→β Γ ⊢ α βn,Σ ⊢ γ
Π,Γ ,Σ ⊢ γ (→EG)
Γ ⊢ α ∆ ⊢ β
Γ ,∆ ⊢ α ∧ β (∧IG)
Π ⊢ α ∧ β αm, βn,∆ ⊢ γ
Π,∆ ⊢ γ (∧EG)
Γ ⊢ α
Γ ⊢ α ∨ β (∨I1G)
Γ ⊢ β
Γ ⊢ α ∨ β (∨I2G)
Π ⊢ α ∨ β αm,Γ ⊢ γ βn,∆ ⊢ γ
Π,Γ ,∆ ⊢ γ (∨EG)
Γ ⊢ α
Γ ⊢ ∼∼α (∼IG)
Π ⊢ ∼∼α α,∆ ⊢ γ
Π,∆ ⊢ γ (∼EG)
Γ ⊢ α ∆ ⊢ ∼β
Γ ,∆ ⊢ ∼(α→β) (∼→I
G)
Π ⊢ ∼(α→β) αm,∼βn,∆ ⊢ γ
Π,∆ ⊢ γ (∼→EG)
Π ⊢ ∼(α ∧ β) ∼αm,Γ ⊢ γ ∼βn,∆ ⊢ γ
Π,Γ ,∆ ⊢ γ (∼∧ EG)
Γ ⊢ ∼α
Γ ⊢ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ I1
G)
Γ ⊢ ∼β
Γ ⊢ ∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ I2
G)
Γ ⊢ ∼α ∆ ⊢ ∼β
Γ ,∆ ⊢ ∼(α ∨ β) (∼∨ I
G)
Π ⊢ ∼(α ∨ β) ∼αm,∼βn,∆ ⊢ γ
Π,∆ ⊢ γ (∼∨ EG).
The inference rules (→EG), (∧EG), (∨EG), (∼EG), (∼→EG), (∼ ∧ EG), and (∼ ∨ EG) are called general elimination rules,
and the other inference rules are called introduction rules. In general elimination rules, the premise containing the logical
connective is calledmajor premise. The other premises are calledminor premises.
We remark that the negation part of GN4 is from the idea of Schroeder-Heister [58]. For example, his general elimination






and it corresponds to (∼→EG).
Definition 4.12. A proof in GN4 is in general normal form if all major premises of the general elimination rules in the proof
are assumptions.
In Definition 4.12, to distinguish the notion of general normal form from the usual notion of (weak) normalization with
respect to reduction, the term ‘‘general normal form’’ in this definition is used.
Theorem 4.13 (Equivalence Between GN4 and LN4). We have the following:
1. if LN4 − (cut) ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ , then there is a general normal proof of Γ ⊢ γ in GN4,
2. if there is a proof of Γ ⊢ γ in GN4, then LN4 ⊢ Γ ⇒ γ .
Proof. • (1) By induction on the proofs P of Γ ⇒ γ in LN4 − (cut). We distinguish the cases according to the last inference
of P . We show only the following case.
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∼(α→β),∆ ⊢ γ (∼→E
G).
• (2) By induction on the proofs Q of Γ ⊢ γ in LN4. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of Q . We
show only the following case.





Π,∆ ⊢ γ (∼→EG).












Π,∆⇒ γ (cut). 
Theorem 4.14 (Normalization). Every proof P of Γ ⊢ γ in GN4 can be transformed into a general normal proof P ′ of Γ ⊢ γ in
GN4.
Proof. Let P be a proof of Γ ⊢ γ in GN4. Then, the sequent Γ ⇒ γ is provable in LN4 by Theorem 4.13(2), and hence Γ ⇒ γ
is provable in cut-free LN4 by the cut-elimination theorem for LN4. By Theorem 4.13(1), there is a general normal proof P ′ of
Γ ⊢ γ in GN4. 
4.3. Other systems
Definition 4.15 (Prawitz’s System PN4 [49]). Prawitz’s natural deduction systemPN4 forN4 is obtained fromNN4 by replacing


















∼(α ∧ β) (∼∧ I1
p)
∼β








Proposition 4.16 (Equivalence Between PN4 and NN4). For any formula γ ,
γ is provable in PN4 iff γ is provable in NN4.
Schroeder-Heister [58] proposed a more general natural deduction framework dealing with some n-ary logical
connectives and also with∼. The following system, called HN4, may be regarded as a special case of his framework.
Definition 4.17 (Special Case of Schroeder-Heister’s System [58], HN4). The inference rules of HN4 are (→I), (∧I), (∨I1),
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Note that HN4 is the standard-style version of the sequent-style system GN4.
Proposition 4.18 (Equivalence Between HN4 and NN4). For any formula γ ,
γ is provable in HN4 iff γ is provable in NN4.
We can extend the uniform calculi (for the positive intuitionistic logic) introduced by Negri and von Plato [41], which
have some general introduction rules.
Definition 4.19 (Extended Version of Negri and von Plato’s Systems [41], UN4). Letm ≥ 0 be any natural number. The natural
deduction system UN4 in sequent calculus style is obtained from GN4 (Definition 4.11) by replacing (→IG), (∧IG), (∨I1G),
(∨I2G), (∼IG), (∼→IG), (∼∧ I1G), (∼∧ I2G) and (∼∨ IG) by the general introduction rules of the form:
α→β,Γ ⊢ γ αm,∆ ⊢ β
Γ ,∆ ⊢ γ (→IU)
α ∧ β,Γ ⊢ γ ∆ ⊢ α Σ ⊢ β
Γ ,∆,Σ ⊢ γ (∧IU)
α ∨ β,Γ ⊢ γ ∆ ⊢ α
Γ ,∆ ⊢ γ (∨I1U)
α ∨ β,Γ ⊢ γ ∆ ⊢ β
Γ ,∆ ⊢ γ (∨I2U)
∼∼α,Γ ⊢ γ ∆ ⊢ α
Γ ,∆ ⊢ γ (∼IU)
∼(α→β),Γ ⊢ γ ∆ ⊢ α Σ ⊢ ∼β
Γ ,∆,Σ ⊢ γ (∼→IU)
∼(α ∧ β),Γ ⊢ γ ∆ ⊢ ∼α
Γ ,∆ ⊢ γ (∼∧ I1U)
∼(α ∧ β),Γ ⊢ γ ∆ ⊢ ∼β
Γ ,∆ ⊢ γ (∼∧ I2U)
∼(α ∨ β),Γ ⊢ γ ∆ ⊢ ∼α Σ ⊢ ∼β
Γ ,∆,Σ ⊢ γ (∼∨ IU).
Proposition 4.20 (Equivalence Between UN4 and GN4). For any formula γ ,
⊢ γ is provable in UN4 iff γ is provable in GN4.
The following system VN4 is the standard-style version of UN4.
Definition 4.21 (Extended Version of Negri and von Plato’s System [41], VN4). VN4 is obtained from HN4 (Definition 4.17) by
























γ (∼∧ I1V )
[∼(α ∧ β)]....
γ ∼β
γ (∼∧ I2V )
[∼(α ∨ β)]....
γ ∼α ∼β
γ (∼∨ IV ).
Proposition 4.22 (Equivalence Between VN4 and NN4). For any formula γ ,
γ is provable in VN4 iff γ is provable in NN4.
In the following,we use two expressions⊢+ α and⊢− α, which stand forα and∼α, respectively. Using these expressions
we introduce a natural deduction system TN4 for N4. The→-free part of TN4 is just Tamminga and Tanaka’s system NDFDE
[63] for Efde.
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Definition 4.23 (Extended Version of Tamminga and Tanaka’s System [63], TN4). Let ⊢∗ γ be ⊢+ γ or ⊢− γ . The inference





⊢+ α→β ⊢+ α
⊢+ β (→E
+)
⊢+ α ⊢+ β
⊢+ α ∧ β (∧I
+)
⊢+ α ∧ β
⊢+ α (∧E1
+)




⊢+ α ∨ β (∨I1
+)
⊢+ β
⊢+ α ∨ β (∨I2
+)







+) ⊢+ ∼α⊢− α (∼E
+) ⊢+ α⊢− ∼α (∼I
−) ⊢− ∼α⊢+ α (∼E
−)









⊢− α ⊢− β
⊢− α ∨ β (∨I
−)
⊢− α ∨ β
⊢− α (∨E1
−)




⊢− α ∧ β (∧I1
−)
⊢− β
⊢− α ∧ β (∧I2
−)





Proposition 4.24 (Equivalence Between TN4 and NN4). For any formula γ ,
1. if γ is provable in NN4, then ⊢+ γ is provable in TN4,
2. if ⊢+ γ (⊢− γ ) is provable in TN4, then γ (∼γ , respectively) is provable in NN4.
5. Concluding remarks
David Nelson’s paraconsistent logic N4 is a common basis for various extended and useful paraconsistent logics which
are widely used in Computer Science. Therefore, to obtain a proof theoretical foundation for N4 is an important issue for
realizing inconsistency-tolerant reasoning with automated theorem-proving. This paper gives a uniform perspective for
such a proof theory.
Various proof systems for N4 and its neighbors were comprehensively studied in this paper. Some basic results including
the completeness, cut-elimination and decidability theorems for N4 were uniformly proved using the syntactical and
semantical embedding theorems of N4 into positive intuitionistic logic. The sequent calculi G4np (contraction-free system),
G5np (resolution related system), Sn4 (subformula calculus), Dn4 (dual calculus) and some standard and less familiar display
sequent calculi were presented and compared. The cut-elimination and equivalence theorems for these calculi were proved.
The natural deduction systems NN4 (standard-style system), GN4 (sequent-style system), UN4 (uniform calculus) and some
extended traditional natural deduction systems were presented. The normalization and equivalence theorems for these
systems were proved.
Some of our recent works on extensions of (a sequent calculus for) N4 are briefly reviewed below. Sequent calculi for
some trilattice logics, whichmay be regarded as extensions of N4 and Arieli and Avron’s bilattice logics, were studied in [34],
and some sequent and tableaux calculi for some intuitionistic counterparts of the trilattice logics were also studied in [75].
The sequent calculi proposed in [34,75] were based on some parts of the trilattice SIXTEEN3, i.e., such sequent calculi are
not a full system for SIXTEEN3. A full sequent system for SIXTEEN3 was proposed in [74], introducing a new mechanism for
representing non-determinism. A paraconsistent constructive linear-time temporal logic, which is obtained from (a sequent
calculus for) N4 by adding temporal operators, was studied in [35], and a classical version of this logic was also studied in
[36]. Extensions of H–B by various kinds of strong negation are studied in [73].
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